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INTRODUCTION
THE freedom of speech is not absolute. For instance, it is widely
acknowledged that in certain circumstances the government may
constitutionally restrict speech.' A decision that government may re-
strict a certain category of speech, however, does not necessarily vali-
date the constitutionality of all possible means of restricting that
speech. For a speech restriction to be constitutional, it is not enough
for the government to show that the speech in question falls within a
1. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1996); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 41, 45
(1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Property, Speech, and Distrust].
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regulable category. The proposed means of speech regulation must
also conform to the First Amendment. This Article labels this kind of
analysis, which focuses on the constitutionality of a particular form of
regulation, as the "constitutionalism of means" to distinguish it from
purely substantive constitutionalism.
In American law, the doctrine of prior restraint regulates the means
that the government can use to restrict speech.2 This doctrine, first
adopted by the Supreme Court in the 1930s in the case of Near v.
Minnesota,3 forbids the implementation of any pre-publication regula-
tions that prevent the publication of speech, such as administrative li-
censing schemes and judicial injunctions against certain types of
speech.4 One analysis of the doctrine of prior restraint views it as an
attempt to ensure that speech rights are protected using liability rules
instead of property rules.5 While it is permissible to punish certain
harmful expressions, such as libels, after their commission, there are
strict limitations on the constitutionality of preventing such expres-
sions before they occur. Because of this general constitutional prohi-
bition against prior restraints, restrictions of speech ordinarily must be
enforced by the imposition of ex post criminal or civil sanctions.
Justifications of the rule against prior restraints tend to focus either
on the possible damage that prior restraints could do to politically
controversial speech6 or on the chilling effect they might have on
challenges to the constitutionality of a given speech restriction This
Article, however, argues that both the doctrine of prior restraint itself
and its customary justifications lack clarity and consistency.
The problem of incommensurability provides a strong argument
against limiting speech regulation to enforcement of liability rules in
both civil and criminal adjudication. "Incommensurability" in this
context refers to the impossibility of providing a reasonable substitu-
tive or comparative value for an item. This Article challenges the pos-
2. In addition to the general constitutional rule prohibiting prior restraints, there
is a non-constitutional rule that equity will not enjoin libel. See Douglas Laycock, The
Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule 164 & n.27 (1991) [hereinafter Laycock, Irrepa-
rable Injury]. This non-constitutional rule, however, has a narrower reach than the
constitutional rule, so it will not be discussed separately. Nevertheless, arguments ne-
gating the constitutionality or wisdom of the doctrine of prior restraint are also clearly
applicable to this principle. In the realm of criminal law, there is a parallel rule that
equity will not enjoin a crime where criminal prosecution would be an adequate rem-
edy. For a discussion of this rule, see id. at 217-20.
3. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
4. See id. at 709-23.
5. This analytical framework was first laid out by Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092
(1972).
6. See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
"Chilling Effect"58 B.U. L. Rev. 685,705 (1978).
7. See id at 693.
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sibility, the propriety, and the morality of enforcing incommensurable
"anti-speech entitlements" such as the individual rights to good repu-
tation and privacy, and the right of the state to national security, with
ex post criminal sanctions or civil penalties.
The negative externalities 8 that the prior restraint regime generates
pose a collateral difficulty. In essence, the system allows the public to
enjoy benefits at the expense of particular individuals. Because the
harms suffered by individuals from unrestrainable speech are incom-
mensurable, a liability rule system cannot provide full compensation
for them. Speakers are therefore not made to bear the full costs of
their speech, creating a classic negative externality problem.
In addition to the freedom to speak, this Article will also focus on
"anti-speech entitlements." An appropriate constitutionalism of
means must reflect, and attempt to achieve, a society's substantive
constitutional balances. Substantive constitutional arrangements do
not entrench freedom of speech alone-freedom of speech is not, af-
ter all, absolute. These arrangements also aim to protect certain anti-
speech entitlements. In systems that provide for an expansive sub-
stantive freedom of speech, anti-speech entitlements take on an even
greater weight because they come into play only in those extreme
situations where there is no choice but to limit the protection afforded
to speech. An effective constitutionalism of means must attempt to
secure these valuable anti-speech entitlements in addition to substan-
tive free speech rights.
One of the undesirable ramifications of the doctrine of prior re-
straint is that it often ironically constricts substantive free speech
rights. If a legal system becomes overly reliant on the doctrine of
prior restraint, it may focus unduly on procedural protections at the
expense of constitutionally protected substantive speech rights.
Moreover, a reliance on the prohibition against prior restraints as-
sumes incorrectly that subsequently imposed penalties will always be
less burdensome on speech than prior restraints.
This Article develops a criticism of the doctrine of prior restraint
using the relationship between means-centered and substantive consti-
tutional theories. By applying liability rules to incommensurable enti-
tlements, the doctrine produces suboptimal levels of protection for
both speech and anti-speech entitlements and creates a number of in-
tractable moral dilemmas. This analysis explores the meaning of in-
commensurability and presents a number of potential definitions-
some of which are radical and some more moderate. Even under a
moderate view of the incommensurability of anti-speech entitlements,
the doctrine of prior restraint produces problematic results.
Further, the problems with the current regime are grounded in re-
8. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 52 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinaf-
ter Posner, Analysis of Law].
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mediable institutional and structural aspects of the law. The need to
implement substantive constitutional arrangements (the "constitu-
tionalism of substances") creates a constitutional duty to change these
doctrines and structures (the "constitutionalism of means"). The
Constitution must dictate the form of legal doctrines and institutional
structures, and not vice versa.
Part I of this Article develops the concept of a constitutionalism of
means. It also presents the doctrine of prior restraint, focusing on the
distinction between prior restraints and subsequent sanctions, the
scope of the doctrine, and its most frequently heard justifications.
This part proceeds to examine prior restraint doctrine through the
lens of Law and Economics, considering the argument that the pur-
pose of the doctrine is to ensure that anti-speech entitlements are pro-
tected exclusively through the use of liability rules. Part II discusses
the concept of incommensurability and explores the problems it cre-
ates for the doctrine of prior restraint in both the civil and criminal
contexts. Part III addresses arguments promoting the doctrine of
prior restraint that are grounded in political values or social theory.
Part IV discusses the special issues created by criminal prior restraints
protecting anti-speech entitlements. Part V summarizes and chal-
lenges arguments in favor of the doctrine that claim that structural or
procedural aspects of our legal system make prior restraints unten-
able. In its last section, this part explores the constitutionality of the
delays that the use of prior restraints can cause. This section con-
cludes that such delays constitute the only serious constitutional ob-
stacle to a regime that makes use of prior restraints. This Article con-
cludes with proposals for a means-centered constitutionalism that is
more consistent with substantive constitutional goals than the doctrine
of prior restraint.
I. PRIOR RESTRAINT AND THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF MEANS
Governmental regulation of behavior must operate within the
boundaries established by respect for individual rights. In addition to
these substantive protections, the Constitution offers procedural safe-
guards of liberty. This part distinguishes means-centered, or proce-
dural, constitutional considerations from substantive rights analyses.
It discusses the relationships among substance, means, and remedies
to establish a framework for analyzing prior restraint doctrine.
A. Constitutionalism of Substances, Constitutionalism of Means, and
Constitutional Remedies
The Constitution confers a range of basic rights on individuals.
When a person has been granted a constitutional right, governmental
authorities, and in certain circumstances other individuals, are pre-
cluded from violating it. This Article refers to the discourse relating
1999]
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to the substance and scope of these constitutional rights as "substan-
tive constitutionalism" or the "constitutionalism of substances."
Substantive constitutionalism stands at the center of constitutional
theory and practice. It deals with the definition of constitutional
rights, not all of which enjoy express mention in the text of the Consti-
tution,9 and with the determination of the boundaries of the various
rights. Most substantive constitutional rights are not absolute; in cer-
tain circumstances they conflict with one another, and in others the
government may restrict them in order to further the common good."0
This is especially true, of course, in relation to secondary constitu-
tional rights, such as economic rights, but it is also true in relation to
freedom of speech, which is considered the cornerstone of human lib-
erty and dignity." As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Consti-
tution allows the freedom of speech to be restricted in certain situa-
tions and given certain conditions.
The restriction of a right may be carried out by diverse means. In
practice, it is possible to restrict a right through the use of criminal
law, civil law, administrative law, or a combination thereof. Rights
may be limited by means of physical or normative prior restraint (ac-
tions taken to prevent a given act from occurring),' 2 by means of sub-
sequent sanctions (penalties imposed in order to create a disincentive
to act in a certain way),13 or by a combination of the two.
It may be constitutionally permissible to limit the circumstances in
which a right can be exercised, but that does not imply that this can be
accomplished by any means whatsoever. The means used to restrict a
constitutional right must also conform to the Constitution. Therefore,
a discourse on the constitutionality of the various means of restricting
constitutional rights takes place alongside the discussion of the consti-
tutionalism of substances. This discourse is the constitutionalism of
means.
One must be careful not to confuse the constitutionalism of means
with the issue of constitutional remedies. Constitutional remedies are
secondary norms; they assume that an infringement of a constitutional
right has taken place and are concerned with the possible ways of re-
dressing such an infringement. By contrast, the constitutionalism of
means deals with the shape of constitutional rights themselves. It
does not assume an infringement of a constitutional right; rather, it in-
vestigates the constitutionality of schemes created to regulate consti-
tutional rights. Only if it is found that the means used to regulate a
9. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (finding a fundamental
right, not specified in the Constitution, for a woman to abort her pregnancy).
10. See Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 50, 331-39 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Posner, Economics of Justice].
11. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (1971).
12. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1202-03 (12th ed. 1991).
13. See id. at 1203.
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particular constitutional right are unconstitutional will the question of
remedies come into play.14
B. The Relationship Betveen Means and Substances: Searching for
Consistency
In cases where rights are absolute, the constitutionalism of means
will inevitably track the constitutionalism of substances.15 Freedom of
speech, however, is not absolute; the pool of constitutionally pro-
tected speech is bounded by a certain set of criteria. 6 The significance
of the doctrine of prior restraint is that the category of substantively
protected speech is narrower than the category of speech that cannot
be restrained by means of prior restraint. 7 According to the doctrine,
there is a constitutional right to publish expressions that are not enti-
tled to substantive constitutional protection, in the sense that such ex-
pressions can be regulated only by ex post sanctions and not by prior
restraints.
This discrepancy between the body of speech that is substantively
14. Thus, a law that required the prior restraint of certain kinds of speech would
probably, given the prior restraint doctrine, be deemed to be in violation of the Con-
stitution. This is so even if the courts determined that the speech in question was not
entitled to full constitutional protection. The relevant question here is not the scope
of the substantive speech right, but the constitutionality of the mode chosen for en-
forcing it. The doctrine of prior restraint is thus part of the constitutionalism of
means and not a question of constitutional remedies. Only after it has been deter-
mined that the restraints are unconstitutional does the question of remedies arise.
Nevertheless, there are some situations in which the issues of constitutional reme-
dies and constitutional means intersect. Such situations arise when courts order
remedies for infringements of constitutional rights that are themselves unconstitu-
tional. For example, if a state actor was producing a discriminatory publication, a
court might order it enjoined as a violation of the equal protection clause. An appeals
court, however, would probably void the injunction on the grounds that it comprised
an unconstitutional prior restraint.
15. Some questions would still exist, because even if the freedom of speech were
absolute, the meaning of "speech" would still need definition. Not all physical acts of
expression are considered "speech" and protected by the substantive constitutional
right to freedom of speech. Obscene publications, no matter what their form, are a
familiar example. Such publications, even though they are "expressions" in the eve-
ryday sense of the word, are not "expressions" within the meaning of the First
Amendment. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973). Nevertheless, the
doctrine of prior restraint does apply, at least partially, to obscene publications. The
reason for this is that obscene publications may resemble protected publications-for
example, indecent publications. If a licensing agency erred and classified protected
speech as "obscene," it would in the process impair substantive free speech rights.
Allowing prior restraint of obscene publications may therefore result in the impair-
ment of freedom of speech.
16. See John Paul Stevens, Address, The Freedom of Speech, 102 Yale LJ. 1293,
1296-97 (1993); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, State Activism and State Censorship, 100
Yale LJ. 2087, 2098-3101 (1991) [hereinafter Fiss, State Activism].
17. See, eg., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 Yale L.J. 409,
426 (1983) (noting that the doctrine of prior restraint may bar injunctions against
speech that the First Amendment does not protect).
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protected by the Constitution and the body of speech that is protected
from prior restraint does not cause any major problems so long as the
aims of the two sets of doctrine are consistent. Problems develop,
however, when the two bodies of law are based on inconsistent theo-
retical grounds, or when there is a real discrepancy between the aims
of the constitutionalism of means and the aims of substantive constitu-
tional theory. In order to achieve consistency between the two, the
framework for regulating means must produce full realization of sub-
stantive freedom of speech in those circumstances that the Constitu-
tion dictates. At the same time, it must ensure that speech rights are
not protected in contexts where substantive constitutional theory
gives preference to other interests.
18
The legal system is not "neutral" towards expressions that are not
protected by substantive freedom of speech. After all, these expres-
sions are unprotected precisely because there is a special justification
for exposing them to regulation and limitation. 9 There are individual
and social interests in the non-publication of prohibited expressions,
not just in the publication of permitted expressions.20 Therefore, ex-
pressions that are not substantively protected by the First Amend-
ment should not receive immunity against prior restraint, nor against
any other means of regulation that guarantees that they will not be
published. This is the only way that the balances sought by substan-
tive constitutional theory will be mirrored in the constitutionalism of
means.
In certain cases, no one form of regulation exists that will enable
perfect consistency in this sense. For instance, the application of sub-
sequent sanctions against damaging unprotected speech does not
guarantee the non-publication of unprotected expressions.21 Means of
prior restraint, on the other hand, have the potential to impair pro-
tected free speech, because the publication of protected speech may
be delayed if a prior restraint order is incorrectly issued.'
It is possible, however, to strive for a different kind of consistency
by determining the means of implementing the freedom of speech and
its limitations that most closely reflect the balances sought by substan-
tive constitutional law. There will inevitably be occasions when sub-
stantive pro-speech rights come into conflict with substantive anti-
speech entitlements.' In these cases, analysis should focus on means
18. See Schauer supra, note 6, at 727.
19. Examples of such "anti-speech entitlements" include concerns of national se-
curity, decency, and reputation. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 591-
94 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-27 (1973);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,483-85 (1957).
20. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 34-37.
21. See infra part IV.B.
22. See infra part V.E.
23. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 570 (discussing the conflict be-
tween a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and the First Amendment
[Vol. 68
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that produce the outcomes preferred by substantive constitutional
concerns. This may require the sacrifice of some anti-speech rights in
the name of robust pro-speech protections. At times, however, it may
also require the use of devices like prior restraint, if and when those
devices will better serve underlying constitutional goals.
In view of the central status that substantive constitutional theory
confers on freedom of speech, there are likely to be far fewer cases of
the latter type than the former. This tendency to favor speech, how-
ever, should not be elided into an overall and absolute preference for
freedom of speech over other societal goals, including those that re-
quire the restraint of speech.24 Assuring that the means for restraining
defective expressions are available does not mean that they should
always or recklessly be used regardless of the consequences for pro-
tected speech. It simply means that when choosing between two
means of enforcing regulations on speech-the use of prior restraints
and the use of ex post sanctions-attention must constantly be paid to
a proper balance of the competing substantive interests at stake.
In essence, the Constitution must be seen as imposing a responsi-
bility to do whatever is necessary to fully implement its substantive
rules. Sometimes this will require creative contouring of the means
the government uses to regulate speech. For instance, in Freedman v.
Maryland,2 the Supreme Court held that an administrative ruling re-
lating to the licensing of a film and judicial review of that ruling had to
occur within a short period of time. 6 If the ruling and review did not
occur within that period, publication of the expression would be al-
lowed regardless of the film's constitutional status.? Freedman pro-
vides an example of a prior restraint that the Court modified in order
to implement the balance that it wanted to achieve between different
substantive rights. Rather than relying on an ossified version of the
prohibition against prior restraints, the Court focused on the substan-
tive rights at stake. This is the type of creative means-based thinking
that this Article proposes should be applied to the doctrine of prior
restraint.
C. The Prior Restraint Doctrine
The doctrine of prior restraint, despite its status as a cornerstone of
the constitutional law of the United States s suffers from a lack of
rights of the press).
24. See supra note 19.
25. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
26. See id. at 58-59.
27. See generally Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint. The Central
Linkage, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 11, 31-32 (1981) (discussing the Freedman decision's effect
of "minimiz[ing] the impact of delay").
28. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,716-17 (1931).
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clarity.29 As discussed below, there is ongoing dispute as to what con-
stitutes a prior restraint for the purposes of the doctrine, 0 what the ra-
tionale behind the doctrine is, how prior restraints are distinguished
from ex post sanctions, and in what exceptional circumstances prior
restraints will be allowed.
Nevertheless, the generally accepted approach is that the doctrine
bars any prohibition on speech issued in advance of publication.31 It
also disallows determinations of the legality of particular expressions
prior to publication.32 There is "a heavy presumption against [the]
constitutional validity" of prior restraint.33 Limitations on freedom of
speech, whether criminal or civil, must therefore be instituted solely
by means of sanctions imposed after the act. While many kinds of
governmental acts can serve as prior restraints, the two archetypal
forms34 of prior restraint are administrative licensing, which is en-
forced by the criminal law,35 and judicial injunctions, which are ulti-
mately enforced through contempt proceedings. 6 In addition to these
two mechanisms, onerous regulatory burdens imposed on certain
classes of expressions are sometimes considered prior restraints.37 Fi-
nally, the denial of a job or financial support on the basis of a previous
expression has also been classified as prior restraint.38 Some have ar-
gued, however, that the latter two categories broaden the doctrine in a
manner that impairs its quality as a legal rule.39 Alternatively, some
29. See Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 505-07 (1970)
[hereinafter Emerson, Freedom of Expression]; Laurence H. Tribe, American Consti-
tutional Law 1057 (2d ed. 1988); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and the Prior Restraint
Doctrine, in Liberalism Divided 121, 130-31 (1996) [hereinafter Fiss, Free Speech];
Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amend-
ment Theory, 70 Va. L. Rev. 53, 53-55 (1984); Main Scordato, Distinction Without a
Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 2-3
(1989).
30. See Rend L. Todd, Note, A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial
Response to Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial participants, 88 Mich.
L. Rev. 1171, 1172-74 (1990).
31. See Near, 283 U.S. at 721.
32. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975)
(overruling a municipal board's content-based rejection of an application for use of a
municipal theater as a prior restraint).
33. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); see Kent Greenawalt,
Fighting Words 16 (1995) (describing the general presumption against prior restraints
in United States law).
34. See Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 648, 655-56 (1955) [hereinafter Emerson, Prior Restraint].
35. See Tribe, supra note 29, at 1039-40; Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note 34,
at 655.
36. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724-25 (1971) (per cu-
riam) (Brennan, J., concurring); Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note 34, at 655-56.
37. Examples include the imposition of a special levy on publications, see Kent R.
Middleton et al., The Law of Public Communication 64-65 (4th ed. 1997), and the re-
quirement of registration as a condition of publication.
38. See Emerson, Freedom of Expression, supra note 29, at 161-63.
39. See id. at 511.
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commentators consider any abrogation of free speech rights without
judicial review to be prior restraint.l For these commentators,
"prior" means "prior" to a competent legal decision, and not merely
prior to any hearing at all.41
Like freedom of speech, however, the prohibition against prior re-
straint of speech is not absolute. A line of exceptions allows the ap-
plication of prior restraint in certain circumstances' As a rule, the
exceptions to the doctrine apply when the threat to First Amendment
values is not significant but the expected damage in the absence of
prior restraint is particularly grave.4 3 The Court has indicated its ap-
proval of prior restraints under narrowly-defined circumstances in
which the speech in question is deemed obscene,. to protect criminal
defendants against violations of their constitutional right to a fair
trial,45 to protect privacy,' in the context of the regulation of public
forums,47 to prevent misleading commercial expressions'I and where
the expression could endanger national security in wartime.49 In cer-
tain contexts, the Court has drawn a distinction between different
forms of expression. 0 The Court has further restricted the scope of
40. See William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: In-
junctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doc-
trine, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 245, 280-81 (1982); see also Redish, supra note 29, at 55-57
(insisting that Court decisions be delivered after full hearing and generally rejecting
decisions restraining expression delivered in interlocutory proceedings).
41. See Tribe, supra note 29, at 1042-45.
42. Some argue that the Supreme Court has tended to expand the circumstances
in which it will permit a prior restraint in the 1990s. See Roy L Moore, Mass Commu-
nication Law and Ethics 143-55 (1994).
43. See Laycock, Irreparable Injury, supra note 2, at 168.
44. See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47-50 (1961); Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,440 (1957). For the content-based definition of obscenity,
see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). For the view that it is necessary to
modify this definition in light of the special characteristics of cyberspace, see Debra
D. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call for a New Obscenity Standard,
9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 87, 108-09 (1996). For the opinion that the doctrine of prior re-
straint has a central role to play precisely in relation to obscenity laws, see Emerson,
Freedom of Expression, supra note 29, at 503-04.
45. See Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976). For a descrip-
tion of the case law in this field, see Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Prior Restraints on the
Media and the Right to a Fair Tria A Proposal for a New Standard, 84 Ky. L.J. 259,
275-93 (1996).
46. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971) (con-
trasting the facts of the case at bar with those of Rowan v. United States Post Office,
397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
47. See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 1138-67 (5th
ed. 1995).
48. See Laycock, Irreparable Injury, supra note 2, at 167.
49. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 passin (1971) (per cu-
riam) (discussing the government's failure to carry its burden in advocating a prior
restraint).
50. For instance, books and newspapers enjoy far greater protection from prior
restraint than films, to which the prohibition is applied more narrowly. See Emerson,
Freedom of Expression, supra note 29, at 511-12.
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prior restraint doctrine by holding that injunctions are permissible
remedies when they neutrally regulate the time, place, and manner of
speech and do not target acts of speech themselves.5 1
The common view in scholarly literature is that for a government
action to qualify as a prior restraint it must consist of an active strike
against a particular expression.52  Providing or withholding govern-
mental financial assistance on the basis of content-based criteria is
therefore generally not considered prior restraint, even if the practical
result of such a system is restraint, absolute or partial, 3 of expres-
sion. 4 Academic commentators do not speak unanimously on this is-
sue, however, and some have argued that funding criteria should be
viewed as prior restraints.5 On the margin, it is certainly plausible to
view absolute abstention from subsidization of art or other forms of
expression as a form of prior restraint, making such an action subject
to judicial review. 6 Commentators who make this argument, how-
ever, may simply be trying to find a way to ensure protection for cer-
tain cherished forms of speech without having to expand substantive
free speech rights any further.
1. A Working Definition of Prior Restraint
Many cases and academic works discuss the distinction between
prior restraint and subsequent sanctions.5 7 While the manner of de-
fining prior restraint in these examples is significant, especially where
prior restraint has been deemed an inappropriate method of regulat-
ing speech, it is important not to fixate on the words "prior restraint"
themselves. The important issue is not the meaning of the words
"prior restraint," but the content-existing or desirable-of the law.
There are no references to "prior restraint" or "subsequent sanctions"
in the First Amendment or any other article of the Constitution, and
accordingly there are no linguistic interpretive constraints to consider.
Thus, the vast amount of time that some authors spend parsing the
linguistic contours of "prior restraints" and "subsequent sanctions" is
51. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 763-64 (1994). For a cri-
tique of the Court's logic in Madsen, see Owen M. Fiss, The Unruly Character of Poli-
tics, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 1, 8-10 (1997) [hereinafter Fiss, Politics].
52. See Steven Helle, Prior Restraint by the Backdoor: Conditional Rights, 39 Viii.
L. Rev. 817, 828 (1994); Ron Smith, Compelled Cost Disclosure of Grass Roots Lob-
bying Expenses: Necessary Government Voyeurism or Chilled Political Speech?, 6
Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 115, 136 (1996).
53. Cf. Fiss, State Activism, supra note 16, at 2097-98 (analogizing the effect of a
denial of a grant to that of a criminal prosecution); Harry Kalven, A Worthy Tradi-
tion: Freedom of Speech in America 301-03 (1988) (distinguishing criminal sanctions
from partial sanctions).
54. See Helle, supra note 52, at 851.
55. See Emerson, Freedom of Expression, supra note 29, at 627-30; Fiss, State Ac-
tivism, supra note 16, at 2088-104.
56. See Fiss, State Activism, supra note 16, at 2104-05.
57. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 68
PRIOR RESTRAINT
at best of limited value; the "natural meaning" of each term is only
tangentially related to the law.' Discussion should not focus upon
what qualifies as a prior restraint or what differentiates a prior re-
straint from a subsequent sanction, but rather what should constitute
the principles and rules for enforcing the substantive norms of free-
dom of speech.
One initial premise is that the definition of legal terms is never neu-
tral. Definitions sometimes contain determinations that are not at all
trivial. A good example of this phenomenon is found in the way prior
restraint has heretofore been defined.
Part I.C began by presenting the common understanding of the doc-
trine of prior restraint. The alternative, working definition presented
below rests on two premises. First, the doctrine of prior restraint
deals with the means used to restrict freedom of speech, not with its
substantive scope. 9 A helpful definition of prior restraint should
therefore not be concerned with the content of an expression, its form,
or the danger it poses, but rather with the form and timing of the re-
striction itself. Second, prior restraint of an expression must be distin-
guished from subsequent sanctions imposed in response to an expres-
sion.' The definition of prior restraint must therefore clarify the
difference between such restraint and "subsequent restraints." While
these two points may be the subject of some dispute, they form the
basis for a useful definition of prior restraint. The definition of the
term should not foreclose discussion of it, but should be viewed as an
initial and partial stage of a more expansive conversation.
These premises challenge those approaches that argue that "the
resolution of questions regarding the constitutionality of [government
regulations that do not impose sanctions on a speaker until the of-
fending communication has taken place] would no longer involve an
invocation or application of the prior restraint doctrine."6 This view,
based largely on the literal meaning of the expression "prior re-
straint," argues that the doctrine should focus solely on the narrow is-
sue of the means used to restrict speech. This approach essentially de-
fines the problem away by arguing that all of the knotty problems
within the current doctrine should simply be moved to other areas of
58. Still, the legal terms are far from superfluous. Legal terms provide a very im-
portant means of communication, without which it would be difficult to pursue any
legal discourse. The lack of clarity that obscures the meanings of basic terms of con-
stitutional law is therefore regrettable. Definitional problems have at times caused
the debate to revolve around the question of what "prior restraint" is, when a focus
on the constitutionality of a given means of restricting speech would be more produc-
tive. Too many critics have wasted their time arguing that a means of restricting
speech that they consider constitutional and proper does not constitute prior restraint,
instead of simply defending the constitutionality of the method directly.
59. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
60. See Scordato, supra note 29, at 30.
61. Id at 31.
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the law. While it is possible that such an approach can produce "a
relatively coherent, generally understandable, and largely predictable
definition of a prior restraint on speech," 62 the advantages it provides
are largely illusory. Limiting the scope of the doctrine actually pro-
vides very few answers; this approach merely suggests that certain
questions should be answered in another framework. So limiting the
doctrine of prior restraint may add to the clarity and coherence of the
doctrine, but it will not add to the clarity and coherence of First
Amendment jurisprudence or constitutional law as a whole.
On the other hand, to ensure the lucidity of the discussion and its
relevance to general constitutional discourse, it is important to employ
a working definition of prior restraint that is close to the generally ac-
cepted legal meaning of the term, and, insofar as possible, to the
common-sense meaning of the words.
The working definition of prior restraint used in this Article will
therefore incorporate the following factors: (1) the form of a restric-
tion and its timing, not the content of an expression or the anticipated
danger arising from it; (2) the difference between prior restraints and
subsequent sanctions; (3) a sufficiently broad perspective to enable
consideration of a proposed "constitutionalism of means"; (4) prox-
imity to the accepted legal conception of the term; and (5) the nexus
to the common-sense meaning of the words.
These factors produce the following working definition: a "prior re-
straint" is any physical or normative means exercised by a governmen-
tal authority to enforce substantive restrictions on a particular act of
speech prior to the publication of that speech and with the purpose of
preventing the publication of that speech. A means exercised after
the commencement of publication, with the purpose of preventing the
continuation of publication, will also be deemed to be a "prior re-
straint."
There are two kinds of prior restraint: physical restraints and nor-
mative restraints. The distinction between physical restraint of speech
and the imposition of sanctions after the publication of the speech is
clear even on an intuitive level. In the first case, the government pre-
vents the publication of the expression.63 In the second case, the gov-
ernment does not physically prevent publication, although the threat
of ex post sanctions will likely deter publication.' The distinction be-
tween normative prior restraints and normative ex post sanctions,
however, is more difficult to grasp.
As explained above,65 certain normative means of restraining ex-
pression, such as injunctions, temporary restraining orders, and ad-
62. Id. at 32.
63. See id. at 2-3.
64. See id.
65. See supra note 58.
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ministrative prohibitions, are forms of prior restraint. These means of
prior restraint can be distinguished from criminal and civil normative
sanctions that operate retroactively in both their purpose and in the
specificity of the speech to which they apply.
The dominant purpose of prior restraint is prevention of an act of
speech.6 In this way prior restraints differ from subsequent sanctions.
While deterrence and prevention of publication are goals of many
civil and criminal speech restrictions that employ ex post sanctions,
coextensive purposes such as redress, particularly in criminal law,67
and the compensation of victims, particularly in civil law, also exist.6s
The second element that distinguishes normative means of prior re-
straint from normative means of subsequent sanctions is the applica-
tion of prior restraints to concrete cases, as distinct from general cate-
69 !tgories. Whereas general prohibitive measures such as statutes or
regulations act as ex post punishments, individual prohibitions such as
permanent or temporary injunctions or administrative orders consti-
tute prior restraints.70 Of course, prior restraints are sometimes used
to prevent the breach of general norms, and not all specifically indi-
viduated legal acts are prior restraints. For instance, a warning by a
prosecutor that the government will press charges if a certain publica-
tion is continued does not fall within the meaning of prior restraint,
despite its specificity,71 because it is not a binding legal norm.
66. Cf Schauer, supra note 6, at 725-26 (describing the primary goal of prior re-
straints as prevention rather than punishment).
67. See Leon Pearl, A Case Against the Kantian Retributivist Theory of Punish-
ment A Response to Professor Pugsley, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 273,274,289 (1982); Louis
Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Prob-
lem of Crime Control, 94 Yale LJ. 315,334,337-38 (1984).
68. The criminal contempt proceedings that are likely to be instituted against per-
sons who breach injunctions and the criminal charges that may be brought against
persons who breach administrative orders do not derogate from this rule, as the pun-
ishment in these proceedings is not in response to the speech itself, but to the breach
of the judicial or administrative order.
69. Nonetheless, it is not easy in every case to classify a legal norm as general or
individual. The level of abstraction of the norm is measured in relative terms. For
example, the prohibition of a specific word could be classified either way. See Howard
0. Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine" A Reply to
Professor Mayton, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 283, 284-85 (1982) (distinguishing between li-
censing mechanisms, which are manifestly prior restraints, and criminal prohibitions,
which are subsequent sanctions). It is difficult, however, to find a substantive differ-
ence between the two mechanisms in the context of the prohibition of a specific word.
Insofar as such a criminal prohibition is constitutional, its effect is identical, or at least
very close, to that of a licensing mechanism.
70. See Tribe, supra note 29, at 1042-45.
71. For the similarity between prior restraint and a warning by a prosecutor with
respect to possible charges relating to a concrete publication, see Fiss, Free Speech,
supra note 29, at 132-33.
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2. The Relationship Between Prior Restraint Doctrine and
Substantive Freedom of Expression
When the United States was founded, and for many years thereaf-
ter, the protection provided to freedom of speech extended only to
protection from prior restraint.72 The definition of prior restraint was
quite narrow, however, as it was based largely on the actual censor-
ship mechanisms that were used in eighteenth-century England.73
Nevertheless, one could argue that during the early years of this coun-
try's history the doctrine against prior restraint and the protection of
freedom of speech were roughly one and the same.74
Currently, however, it is customary to distinguish between the sub-
stantive standards that establish the scope and boundaries of freedom
of speech on the one hand, and the governmental means used to re-
strict speech on the other,75 despite the fact that the two share a com-
mon constitutional anchor in the First Amendment.76 The doctrine of
prior restraint is concerned with the means used to restrict freedom of
speech and not with the extent or substance of speech. It deals with
limitations on form and timing, rather than on substance.77 It is rele-
vant only to expressions that are outside the ambit of substantive First
Amendment protection;78 "[t]he theoretical basis for the prior re-
straint doctrine is... a question of process, not substance. '79 A sub-
stantively protected expression may not be restrained either ex ante or
ex post, its publication may not be prevented by means of prior re-
straint, nor can compensation be subsequently imposed or ordered in
respect thereof. The doctrine of prior restraint, therefore, only comes
into play when the speech in question does not enjoy full First
Amendment protection, rendering the speaker exposed to some kind
of punishment."
Supreme Court Justice Byron White noted that "failure by the
Government to justify prior restraints does not measure its constitu-
72. See Emerson, Freedom of Expression, supra note 29, at 504.
73. See id. at 504.
74. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 224 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, De-
mocracy and the Problem of Free Speech xii-xiii, 4 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, De-
mocracy]. But see Jeffery A. Smith, Prior Restraint. Original Intentions and Modern
Interpretations, 28 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 470 (1987) ("In the case of the first
amendment, historical evidence supports the absolutists' position that the Framers
intended that the press clause prohibit not only prior restraint, but also all content-
based controls available to government.").
75. See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 410-11.
76. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Comment, Snepp v. United States: The CIA Secrecy
Agreement and the First Amendment, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 662, 667 (1981).
77. See Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note 34, at 648; Schauer, supra note 6, at
725.
78. See Tribe, supra note 29, at 1040-41.
79. Redish, supra note 29, at 89.
80. See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate and the Constitution 141 (1991).
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tional entitlement to a conviction for criminal publication."8' Ac-
cordingly, the imposition of onerous taxes on permitted publications is
not a prior restraint, but actual substantive impairment of free speech
rights.'m The body of speech subject to prior restraints is always lim-
ited by the scope of substantive speech rights, because the means-of-
restriction question only arises after the determination that the speech
may be restricted in the first place. It is therefore entirely possible to
support both expansive substantive speech rights and a system that
allows prior restraint of unprotected speech. 3
The doctrine of prior restraint does not expand substantive freedom
of speech; it merely limits the remedies afforded against those expres-
sions that are not entitled to full constitutional protection. For an ex-
pression to be enjoined, it is not enough to show that full substantive
freedom of speech does not protect it. Rather, the expression must
not only be outside the scope of the substantive protection of the First
Amendment, it "also must be so in some dramatic, clear, and special
way."84
Generalized, all-encompassing regulation, which applies to both
protected and unprotected expressions, may occur either by means of
prior restraint or subsequent sanctions. The constitutional defect in
such regulation does not, therefore, lie in the fact that it comprises
prior restraint of speech, but in the fact that it applies to legitimate
expressionsY Furthermore, nothing in a policy supporting prior re-
straint of unprotected speech conflicts with a positive definition of
freedom of speech that extends to mandatory governmental support
of publications, or at the very least to a requirement of content neu-
trality in funding decisions. It is therefore easier and more logical to
view abstention-from-support cases as substantive issues, wherein the
constitutional problem is not prior restraint but the fact that support is
being denied to an expression by virtue of its contents.O Because the
81. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,733 (1971) (White, J., concur-
ring).
82. Cf., e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (holding a
state license tax imposed only on owners of newspapers with a weekly circulation of
over 20,000 unconstitutional).
83. In fact, there is an internal logic to such a position, because if a society grants
protection to a wide variety of speech, the remaining unprotected classes of speech
are likely to be those that society would benefit the most from having restrained.
Some of the exceptions to current prior restraint doctrine make more sense when
seen in this light. For instance, the revelation of a state secret may be restrained if it
poses a serious threat to national security interests, in part because of the severity of
the damage that might otherwise occur.
84. Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 40 (1978) [hereinafter Fiss, Injunc-
tion].
85. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 12-13.
86. For a different view, see generally Helle, supra note 52 (analyzing the ration-
ales underlying the doctrine of prior restraint). For the need to adapt the laws of
freedom of speech to the context of subsidizing speech by the State, see generally
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speed, 106 Yale LI. 151 (1996) (examining the applica-
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substantive question always has to be answered before the means
question is even raised, opinions about prior restraint as a means of
speech regulation should be secondary to substantive speech com-
mitments.
Nevertheless, some courts have skipped the substantive questions
altogether and validated speech restrictions merely because they were
carried out by means of subsequent sanctions and not by means of
prior restraint.' These judgments, which have contributed to the lack
of clarity within the doctrine of prior restraint, were mistaken. A
condition for the imposition of any sanction against a publication,
whether it be a subsequent or prior sanction, must be that the expres-
sion under consideration is not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion. The fact that freedom of speech is limited in a manner that ap-
pears less onerous does not validate the restriction. At the same time,
it is hard to view these judgments as random accidents-they are the
inevitable result of the misalignment between the doctrine of prior re-
straint and societal conceptions of substantive freedom of speech.
The same elision of prior restraint and substantive speech rights oc-
casionally occurs in the academic discourse on the subject. For in-
stance, one commentator argues that prior restraints impair the public
value of permitted expressions because all such expressions will be
perceived as reflecting the views of the government.8 This assertion,
however, does not address prior restraint as a means of regulation at
all. The problem with this imagined world, "in which anti-speech in-
junctions were sought and issued with regularity,"8 9 is that it lacks ef-
fective substantive protections for free speech. It does not even ad-
dress the means issue. In contrast, another scholar notes that:
If prior restraints were not subjected to special disfavor, the substan-
tive first amendment standards applied would presumably be no less
protective than those used in subsequent punishment schemes....
Given the context of our constitutional system, prior approval of
speech thus would not amount to a government stamp of approval
on speech .... 90
3. Is There a Meaningful Difference Between Prior Restraint and
Subsequent Sanctions?
Because prior restraints, criminal penalties, and ex post civil sanc-
tions are all designed to stop expressions from being published, the
various methods of speech regulation cannot be distinguished by the
tion of constitutional restraints to subsidized speech).
87. See Redish, supra note 29, at 54.
88. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 64.
89. Id. at 30.
90. Redish, supra note 29, at 70.
[Vol. 68
PRIOR RESTRAINT
influence they have on actors' pre-publication decisions." Certain
commentators are therefore of the opinion that there is actually no
substantive difference between prior restraints and subsequent sanc-
tions. 2 The various means are "the same side of the same coin."93
Thus, even if an injunction has been issued "restraining" speech, the
only punishable act is disobedience of the injunction, which requires
publication of the speech.94 Like "subsequent sanctions," injunctions
only have effect after the speech in question has been published. The
difference between prior restraint and subsequent punishment thus
lies in the administration and not in the substance. 95 The value of such
an argument, however, is questionable. An approach that denies the
existence of substantive differences between means classified as prior
restraints and those classified as subsequent sanctions does not argue
that prior restraints are harmful; it merely argues that they are arbi-
trary in the absence of any other justification. Such an analysis sug-
gests no cogent reason exists for preferring prior restraints over sub-
sequent sanctions, or vice versa. This line of argument is completely
different from those that accept the distinction but take the view that
there is still no reason for our current preference for ex post remedies.
Arguments that a meaningful distinction between prior restraint
and subsequent sanctions exists are more convincing, and this Article
argues that there are certain benefits to be derived from the use of
prior restraints. Before proceeding to this analysis, it is important to
answer those critics who believe that there is no real basis for the dis-
tinction. First, even the assumption that in certain circumstances
there are common denominators between the two means of restricting
speech does not render the distinction superfluous or meaningless. As
Archibald Cox noted, "[c]lassification is important... because the
earlier efforts to bring all first amendment cases under a 'clear and
present danger' test have rightly given way to a variety of standards
keyed to the character of the restriction."' 6 Concepts and distinctions
inevitably have margins that are nebulous. This does not reduce the
value of the concepts in question; it merely shows that they are theo-
retical concepts. 9
91. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 11.
92- See Mayton, supra note 40, at 275-80; Scordato, supra note 29, at 34-35.
93. Mayton, supra note 40, at 262.
94. See Scordato, supra note 29, at 3.
95. See Mayton, supra note 40, at 265. This reasoning is not limited to the context
of freedom of speech. It follows that there is no substantive difference amongst prop-
erty rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules generally. See Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 5, at 1089.
96. Archibald Cox, Freedom of Expression 6 (1981).
97. The useful question is not whether a real and significant distinction between
prior restraints and subsequent sanctions exists in every case, but whether the distinc-
tion possesses a kernel of usefulness. Concepts and distinctions in the field of law are
not a goal in themselves, but a means of achieving political or social objectives and
maintaining the harmony of the legal system. See R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence 226
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The dispute as to the correct classification of the means used to re-
strict speech lies at the heart of cases such as Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan.9 In Bantam and similar cases the classification is clearly sig-
nificant to the litigants. 99 For example, the existence of a prior re-
straint may have a greater deterrent value for a potential speaker than
the threat of subsequent punishment; future sanctions will not neces-
sarily deter someone who is determined to express herself and who is
willing to bear the consequences, or someone who is mistakenly con-
vinced that the intended publication is protected by the Constitu-
tion.100
Second, "prior restraint" sometimes means physical restraint, and
not just the issuance of a paper injunction.1 1 In the criminal context,
decisions regarding prior restraint are likely to be enforced by the po-
lice and other law enforcement officials. Enforcement is likely to con-
sist of the arrest of a person desiring to express himself, the forcible
dispersal of a demonstration or protest, the confiscation of communi-
cations media through which expressions are due to be published, or
similar physical methods. A policeman who reasonably suspects that
an offense is about to be committed may, as a rule, intervene and
physically prevent its commission or completion10 The criminal law,
then, is not solely a framework for punishment after the fact; it allows
law enforcement officers to intervene in order to prevent or stop an
act.
103
In the civil law context there are also differences between contempt
hearings and ex post sanctions. For instance, coercive civil contempt
proceedings are distinct from criminal contempt proceedings. °4
Criminal contempt is a matter of criminal law, in that the offender
failed to satisfy an injunction in the past.105 In contrast, coercive con-
(1985). If legal concepts and classifications make real-world differences, then they are
unquestionably worthy of legal analysis.
98. 372 U.S. 58 (1963); see Mayton, supra note 40, at 263-64.
99. See Bantam, 372 U.S. at 70-71; Mayton, supra note 40, at 263.
100. See Bantam, 372 U.S. at 69-71; Mayton, supra note 40, at 264-65.
101. Cf Scordato, supra note 29, at 30-31 (expressing the view that prior restraint
of speech consists solely of physical restraint).
102. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
103. The disfavoring of prior restraints of speech has significant repercussions
within the field of criminal law, where a complete category of offenses is treated dif-
ferently because of concerns about prior restraint. Law enforcement authorities are
required to sit with folded arms and wait until the initial step in the commission of an
offense has been performed. Only when an offense has been initiated are the authori-
ties entitled to stop it and to begin coercive contempt proceedings. These are mani-
festly proceedings of prior restraint, not punitive proceedings. They are not intended
to punish the defendant for breaching an injunction. Rather, their sole function is to
cause the defendant to refrain from breaching the injunction in the future.
104. For the distinction between the different types of contempt, see Douglas Lay-
cock, Modem American Remedies 712-20 (2d ed. 1994).
105. For a discussion of the argument that the penal character of criminal contempt
proceedings indicates that an injunction is not substantively different from a criminal
[Vol. 68
PRIOR RESTRAINT
tempt proceedings are intended to force the defendant to obey a
judgment in the future.101 These are clearly non-punitive, prior-
restraint proceedings. They are not intended to punish the defendant
for breaching an injunction. Their sole purpose is to cause the defen-
dant to refrain from breaching it in the future. 107
Third, there are many cases in which the practical effect of an in-
junction is more likely to resemble a prior restraint than a threat of ex
post sanctions. The Pentagon Papers affair, considered in New York
Times Co. v. United States,l1n illustrates this point. The Times, when
required to refrain from publishing the Pentagon Papers and threat-
ened with court proceedings under the Espionage Act,1 9 gave notice
that it would resist in court the application for an injunction, but
would nevertheless obey the court's final decision.110 When the trial
court did indeed issue an injunction against publication, the newspa-
per honored the injunction despite denying its constitutionality and
filing an appeal against it."' While the Times was willing to risk
criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act, it was not prepared to
defy the court's injunction." It may be argued that the Times's con-
duct was rooted in an idiosyncratic distinction that the newspaper
drew between the political authorities and the court, wherein the
newspaper, for reasons of principle, was not ready to disobey a court's
judgment. There were certainly more radical critics of the govern-
ment than the Times who failed to draw such a distinction between
the two authorities, and who were willing to disobey judicial injunc-
tions.lU Nevertheless, the essential point is that in many cases-per-
haps the majority of cases-there may be a difference between a po-
tential speaker's reaction to a threatened ex post application of
criminal law and an existing judicial injunction or concrete administra-
tive prohibition."4
There are several reasons for this difference. First, the injunctive
prohibition, see Mayton, supra note 40, at 277-78 and infra part IV.
106. It is not certain, of course, that sanctions imposed within the framework of
such proceedings will lead the defendant to obey the injunction. There are cases
where the state does not have the power to ensure the implementation of the judg-
ment. See Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement: The
Terminally Stubborn Contemnor, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 185, 189 (1991).
107. Naturally, coercive contempt proceedings will be instituted and sanctions will
be imposed only where it emerges that the defendant is not complying with the in-
junction.
108. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1994); see New York Times, 403 U.S. at 720-21 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
110. See Fiss, Injunction, supra note 84, at 71.
111. See Aviam Soifer, Born Classified, Born Free: An Essay For Henry Schiwar-
zchild, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1369,1383-84 (1998).
112- See Fiss, Injunction, supra note 84, at 71.
113. See id.
114. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
Stan. L. Rev. 1471,1517 (1998).
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process personalizes the law. 115 It is not a general and abstract prohi-
bition that can be interpreted in a variety of ways, or a rule whose
precise content, or even whose existence, is unknown to the average
citizen. Rather, an injunction is a concrete prohibition that is person-
ally directed against a certain person in a particular familiar context.
Second, the punishment for breaching a prior restraint is certain.)1 6
The potential burden of such a personally directed prohibition ap-
pears greater than that of a general, retrospectively applied law.
Third, the breach of an injunction involves not only an offense against
a particular substantive law that the person in breach may believe to
be defective, but also comprises a breach of a judicial order."7 The
breach involves a repudiation of the court, an institution essential to
guarantee individual rights against the government. Few people dis-
pute the importance of the courts and the necessity of general obedi-
ence to their judgments, even though those judgments will occasion-
ally be mistaken.
Even if the collateral bar rule, which formally precludes persons in
breach of judgments from raising constitutional arguments in con-
tempt proceedings, n8 were to be annulled, it is unlikely that many
people would choose to make their constitutional arguments in a con-
tempt hearing instead of on appeal.'1 9 To a certain extent, individuals
give the same special deference to administrative orders as to judicial
rulings. This extra deterrent effect helps to explain the decision in
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,20 in which the majority classified the
recommendations of an administrative agency as prior restraint, even
though those recommendations did not purport to have binding ef-
fect.2 1
The fourth difference between injunctions and ex post sanctions is
that the collateral bar rule may apply to decisions classified as prior
restraints,122 whether judicial'23 or administrative. 24 This rule forbids
115. See Fiss, Injunction, supra note 84, at 28,71.
116. See Powe, supra note 80, at 152-53.
117. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796
(1987).
118. See infra part V.D.
119. See Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 539,
558-59 (1977).
120. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
121. See id. at 64. Even were it to be proven that in certain contexts injunctions
enhance the moral imperative of disobedience and therefore encourage infractions of
the law, this is a consideration that can easily be factored into the decision making
process of the person petitioning for the injunction. Moreover, the increased ten-
dency of some people to break the law when an injunction is in place is not a ground
for negating the distinction between injunctions and means of subsequent punish-
ment.
122. The rule's application to prior restraints of speech is uncertain. See infra part
V.D.
123. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307,321 (1967).
124. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395,414 (1953).
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indirect attacks on the constitutionality of a specific judicial injunction
or administrative order during any criminal or civil proceedings insti-
tuted against the person in breach of that injunction or order. So long
as the collateral bar rule is relevant to one means of restricting speech
and not to another, the two must be considered separately, even if the
ultimate conclusion proves to be an acknowledgment of the constitu-
tionality of both schemes.
Indeed, Owen Fiss has expressed the view that there would be no
reason to question a court's power to issue injunctions restraining
publications if no obstacle impeded indirect constitutional attacks on
the injunction during contempt proceedings.125 Even if one accepts
this position, however, justification for the distinction between the two
means of implementing speech restrictions would still exist for the
other reasons discussed above.
The arguments presented in this subsection yield the conclusion
that it is both justifiable and useful to distinguish between schemes
that restrict speech through the use of prior restraints and those that
make use of subsequent sanctions. The different means of regulation
are appropriate to different sets of circumstances.
4. Prior Restraint, Liability Rules, and Property Rules
As noted above, there are cases in which the Constitution limits
freedom of speech for the purpose of preventing damage to other in-
terests, such as national security, public morals, or the reputation of a
person.126 In such cases, the holders of these interests-be they the
state, the public at large, or individual persons-have entitlements,
the content of which is the right to have the harmful expressions not
be published. For example, the right of publicity or good reputation
means only that another person will not express him or herself in a
way that will cause unjustified harm to the reputation of the holder of
the right.2 7 The state's ability to restrict certain expressions that harm
national security amounts to an entitlement to non-publication of
these expressions. 12s This is also true with respect to obscene publica-
tions. 29 Similarly, criminal prohibitions, which are intended to protect
the public as a whole, give rise to a societal right-the right to the
non-breach thereof.'3 As these examples indicate, "entitlements"
125. See Fiss, Injunction, supra note 84, at 29-30.
126. See Ronald Turner, Regulating Hate Speed; and the First Amendment: The
Attractions of, and Objections to, an Explicit Harms-Based Analysis, 29 Ind. L Rev.
257,266-69 (1995).
127. See id. at 274.
128 See id. at 273.
129. See id. at 279.
130. For the different types of rights and opposing duties, see Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 35-60
(1919).
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here are not necessarily the rights of individuals, as is typically the
case with constitutional rights; they frequently belong to the state or
to society at large.
The language of "entitlements" sets up a helpful way of analyzing
prior restraint doctrine. Because individuals, society, and the state
have certain "anti-speech" entitlements, or entitlements that require
limitation of the speech rights of others, the question of how to best
protect those entitlements must be addressed. Liability rules, prop-
erty rules, or inalienability rules may provide an answer."' "An enti-
tlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone
who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it
from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitle-
ment is agreed upon by the seller. ' 132  The state, after deciding to
grant a right of this type, is not involved in determining its value.
An entitlement is protected by a liability rule if it can be purchased
from its holder for a price that is set by the state, not by the holder.33
The person paying the price set by the state does not need to obtain
the consent of the holder in order to purchase the right.134 In contrast,
an entitlement is protected by an inalienability rule if "its transfer is
not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller."'13 Inal-
ienability rules prohibit certain kinds of transactions entirely.136
In practice, the three categories are not completely distinguishable
from one another,137 and there are numerous cases in which an enti-
tlement is protected by a combination of the three kinds of rules.
The constitutional bias against prior restraints results in the use of
liability rules to protect civil law anti-speech entitlements. 38 In other
131. The concepts are drawn from Calabresi and Melamed's framework. See
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1089.
132. Id. at 1092.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights,
85 Colum. L. Rev. 931, 934-35 (1985); see also Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple
Virtues of The Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2201, 2202 (1997) (responding to Rose-
Ackerman's criticism of the simplicity of the author's framework).
137. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1093.
138. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment:
A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 Ind. L.J. 47, 64 (1994). Some commenta-
tors argue, however, that even where the entitlement is protected by property rules,
the rate of compensation is determined by the state, and that this rate is artificially
high, making the impairment of the entitlement not worthwhile. See Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liabil-
ity Rules, 105 Yale L.J. 235, 237-38 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres & Talley, Advantages];
Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Fa-
cilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027, 1032-33, 1036 (1995). Nevertheless, the
means used to protect anti-speech entitlements possess great theoretical and practical
significance. See supra part I.C.2. For the argument that differences in the degree of
protection that entitlements receive influence their substantive contents, see Jules L.
Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 Yale L.J. 1335,
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words, a party interested in impairing an anti-speech entitlement has
the power to do so, but in return he or she must pay the holder of the
entitlement compensation at a rate determined by the state. The rate
is usually determined subsequently as a damage award in a civil suit.139
For example, rights of publicity and good reputation are not pro-
tected by property rules because the holder of such an entitlement is
not free to decide whether he or she wishes to sell it, and, if so, for
how much. Under the prior restraint doctrine, the entitlement holder
cannot obtain an injunction preventing the publication of an expres-
sion that would damage his or her reputation. Without the doctrine of
prior restraint, the holder of the entitlement could refuse to sell it or,
at the very least, could hold out for the price that he or she deemed
satisfactory. Rights of publicity and good reputation are also not pro-
tected by inalienability rules; if they were, libel would be absolutely
and criminally prohibited, regardless of whether or not the "victim"
consented.' Instead, the victim of libel is entitled to compensation
from the person harming him or her at a rate that is determined by a
court.
Taking the economic analogy one step further, the doctrine of prior
restraint, whereby anti-speech entitlements are protected by liability
rules, can be seen as a system for taxing unvanted expressions. An
expression that is fully protected by the First Amendment is "free."
The person expressing him- or herself is free to do so without paying
compensation for damages caused by his or her words, and the person
suffering the harm bears the cost. An expression that is not fully pro-
tected, on the other hand, will be "taxed" by the state through the im-
position of ex post civil damages at rates determined by the courts,
and the person publishing the expression will bear the burden of pay-
ing the tax.
As discussed below, this "law and economics" analysis of prior re-
straint exposes four serious weaknesses within the doctrine. First, the
doctrine blurs the boundary between the scope of the substantive
freedom of speech and the means used to regulate speech, making the
First Amendment discourse overly means-centric. Second, over-
reliance on the prohibition against prior restraints weakens the sense
of free speech supremacy that should run through constitutional law.
Third, the prohibition creates negative externality problems, whereby
individuals shift the costs of their actions onto society at large.
Fourth, in the speech context, it is not clear that liability rules produce
the lowest transaction costs. The remainder of this part discusses
1336-37 (1986).
139. See Kwall, supra note 138, at 64.
140. Generally, even in states where defamation is a criminal offense, one of the
elements of the offense is the lack of the consent of the victim. Accordingly, even in
these states it is possible to say that the right to one's reputation is protected by prop-
erty rules, not inalienably rules.
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these four issues.
a. Blurring the Substantive Freedom of Speech
A general acceptance of law and economics theory is not necessary
to an appreciation of some of the insights that it can provide. Law and
economics can be especially helpful when one is trying to analyze the
efficiency with which a particular doctrine achieves its purported ra-
tionales.
The primary rationale given for the prohibition against prior re-
straints is usually the desire not to chill speech.141 An efficient system
of deterring harmful speech would be undesirable if it incidentally
precluded valuable expressions from reaching the public, thereby lim-
iting output in the marketplace of ideas. If society's goal is to allow as
much speech as possible to reach the public, the prohibition against
prior restraints makes sense because it allows all speech to reach the
marketplace initially and therefore errs on the side of too much
speech.
Even exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraint claim jus-
tification in the argument that society seeks to maximize the total
amount of speech that is produced; as Thomas Emerson asserted, "[a]
system of free expression can be successful only when it rests upon the
strongest possible commitment to the positive right and the narrowest
possible basis for exceptions."142 Because the central rationale for the
doctrine of prior restraint and its recognized exceptions is the produc-
tion of maximal amounts of speech, the doctrine necessarily "intrudes
into" the substantive constitutional arrangements relating to freedom
of speech. In the process it also obfuscates them: when courts be-
come overly focused on the proposed methods for controlling speech,
they often lose sight of the underlying substantive questions. As
noted above,143 the first question should always be a substantive one
about whether the targeted speech is protected, not a question about
prior restraint. The constitutionalism of means must be consistent
with the constitutionalism of substances. 14 Establishing an independ-
ent agenda within the constitutionalism of means that is isolated from
the substantive principles of the Constitution undermines those prin-
ciples and makes their message imprecise and unclear.
The blurring of substantive First Amendment values occurs when
the central grounds underlying the doctrine of prior restraint prove to
141. As stated in the oft-quoted aphorism of Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of
Consent 61 (1975). This aphorism has occasionally been quoted by the Supreme
Court. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); see also Tribe,
supra note 29, at 1041 n.16 (arguing that chilling expression may be a far more serious
issue than prior restraint itself).
142. Emerson, Freedom of Expression, supra note 29, at 10.
143. See supra part L.A-B.
144. See supra part I.
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be inconsistent with those underlying substantive constitutional laws.
b. Impairment of the Supremacy of Freedom of Speech
It is doubtful that the doctrine of prior restraint is compatible with a
regime that grants constitutional supremacy to freedom of speech. In
a regime that values free speech highly, freedom of speech can be re-
stricted only in those exceptional cases where other particularly im-
portant interests are at risk.145 When an expression is permitted, as a
liability regime allows, the speech in question has, by definition, been
deemed not to threaten such an important interest.
If there are no especially important rights at issue, the justification
for burdening the speech and imposing payment upon the publisher is
unclear. An expression that is not so injurious as to justify its preven-
tion also does not warrant the imposition of costs on its publisher.
The imposition of such costs chills speech and discriminates between
the rich, who can afford to pay these costs, and the poor, who cannot.
Such results are not unconstitutional; they are, however, incompatible
with a constitutional scheme that purports to grant supreme status to
freedom of speech.
As discussed above, the prohibition against prior restraint is subject
to a long list of exceptions. 14 In almost every case where an expres-
sion might cause substantive impairment to an interest of serious pub-
lic importance, the barrier against prior restraint suddenly seems less
than hermetic.147 On the other hand, liability in the form of damages
is often imposed on those who publish expressions that do not pose a
serious danger to important public interests.148
The doctrine of prior restraint transforms a test that should exam-
ine whether speech is sufficiently dangerous to justify its lack of con-
stitutional protection into a test of whether it is possible to prevent the
expression through prior restraint. Problems then ensue because our
current ex post liability regime excessively burdens protected speech,
probably more so than property rules would limit it in certain situa-
tions.149
145. See supra notes 1,19 and accompanying text.
146. See supra part I.A.
147. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (stating that an injunction would be justified if disclosure would "surely
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage" to national security); Raneta
Lawson Mack, Digital Signatures, the Electronic Economy and the Protection of Na-
tional Security: Some Distinctions with an Economic Difference, 17 J. Marshall J.
Computer L. & Info. 981, 990-91 (1999).
148. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
149. See supra part II.
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c. Negative Externalities
Negative externalities occur when a person is required to bear the
costs of an action over which he or she had no control.15 0 Negative ex-
ternalities are usually inefficient, although in some cases the costs of
mitigation may be cheaper when borne by outsiders than when borne
by the person who caused a particular injury.' The prohibition
against prior restraints leads to negative externalities because speak-
ers and the public are allowed to enjoy certain rights while the costs of
those rights are borne exclusively by the holders of the violated anti-
speech entitlements. 52 Costs are not internalized to speakers or to the
public; rather, they fall on a distinct subset of the population.
Economic analysis, of course, does not take into account the fact
that our present moral institutions do indeed place moral responsibil-
ity on those who actually cause the damage, regardless of who the
cheapest cost avoider is. Even disregarding this reservation, however,
it is doubtful that the creation of the negative externalities in this
situation can be justified. First, in the same way that anti-speech enti-
tlements that have been impaired are incommensurable in monetary
terms, 153 they are also incommensurable in terms of the public inter-
ests underlying the doctrine of prior restraint.
Second, in this context, and precisely because of the incommen-
surability of the relevant entitlements, those injured do not have spe-
cial means of mitigating their damages that would justify the negative
externalities economically.
Third, the balancing between the public interest in freedom of
speech and private interests in, for example, one's good name or pri-
vacy, should be carried out within substantive constitutional discourse.
If private interests outweigh public interests in the substantive bal-
ancing, and prior restraint only comes into play when the speech is not
fully protected," then there is no justification for changing the bal-
ance when trying to decide how best to protect those private interests.
Such a change would be an unjustified deviation in the realm of means
from agreed-upon substantive arrangements.
d. Transaction Costs
According to Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, one should
always try to protect entitlements with the type of rule that will pro-
150. See Richard Comes & Todd Sandier, The Theory of Externalities, Public
Goods, and Club Goods 29 (1986) (defining an externality as "an event which confers
an appreciable benefit [or] inflicts an appreciable damage" upon a third party).
151. See Posner, Analysis of Law, supra note 8, at 139.
152. See id. at 545.
153. Incommensurability is discussed extensively infra at part II.
154. See supra part I.C.2.
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duce the most economically efficient system.55 In their view, when
transaction costs are high, liability rules are the most efficient way to
protect entitlements. 56 In contrast, they argue that property rules are
a more efficient way to protect entitlements when transaction costs
are low.'5 Given this focus on transaction costs, it would seem that a
distinction should be drawn in the speech context between publica-
tions that injure a broad section of the public and publications that
injure a single person or a small number of people.
When a publication of the first type is at issue,lss the cost of individ-
ual negotiations between the publisher and each member of the de-
famed group is likely to be very high, as such negotiations will give
rise to collective action and hold-out problems."9 The cost of gather-
ing the members of a large group is huge, and sometimes such an op-
eration is logistically impossible. Moreover, the completion of the
transaction is contingent upon the separate consent of each member
of the group; each of them is therefore in a position to extort in a
manner that will yield her profits at the expense of the other parties.I6
In such circumstances, it appears that because of transaction costs,
private law anti-speech entitlements should be protected exclusively
by liability rules. Accordingly, in defamation claims brought by a
large group, damages are more efficient means of regulation than in-
junctions, because injunctions would produce abnormally high trans-
action costs.
The calculus provided by Calabresi and Melamed yields a different
result when a single individual or a small number of people holds the
anti-speech entitlement. In such cases no special transaction cost
problems arise.'6' According to this analysis, it would be proper to
protect these entitlements, such as privacy, by means of property
rules.162
155. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1093-94.
156. In part this is because the costs of negotiations will be more expensive than
the market inefficiencies caused by government pricing. See id. at 1106-10.
157. See id.
158. The defamation of a sizable section of the public is an example of this type of
publication.
159. See Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. Legal Stud. 351, 351-52
(1991).
160. See id. at 356; William A. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws 187-88
(1985).
161. Except, of course, for potential bilateral monopoly problems. One could
imagine situations in which no mass markets existed for certain anti-speech entitle-
ments; would-be purchasers would then find themselves trapped in a bilateral mo-
nopoly. The significance of such problems is an empirical question.
162. For example, a newspaper that is interested in publishing an item that violates
a specific person's privacy may approach that person and conduct negotiations with
her. Such negotiations do not engender particularly heavy costs. It is therefore pos-
sible to conclude that in such cases the price of privacy should be determined by the
holder of the entitlement, who will also be entitled to refuse to sell it. For the right to
privacy as property, see Posner, Economics of Justice, supra note 10, at 258-59.
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This part introduced the doctrine of prior restraint and outlined
some of the justifications that have been advanced in its support. A
law and economics analysis of the bar against prior restraint, and the
resulting reliance upon liability rules to protect speech rights, high-
lights the inefficiency of some aspects of the liability rule regime. The
next part applies this law and economics framework to examine the
major problem with a liability-rule scheme of speech regulation: the
incommensurable harm that is often done to anti-speech entitlements
through the publication of speech that is not fully constitutionally pro-
tected.
II. INCOMMENSURABILITY AND PRIOR RESTRAINT
Prior restraint doctrine ensures that anti-speech entitlements are
protected by liability rules instead of property rules.163 This analysis
brings into focus one of the major drawbacks of such a system, the
problem of incommensurability. 164 Law and economics assumes that
questions of preference, utility and choice are not particularly diffi-
cult, 65 but on an intuitive level, especially in the context of speech, the
ranking and commodification of moral and political values that the
approach requires seems problematic. There is something unsettling
about the idea that non-market values and entitlements can be easily
quantified in monetary terms. In recent years this problem has at-
tracted widespread interest, particularly from scholars of jurispru-
dence, who have attempted to analyze with more rigor our common
intuitive forebodings. 166
Incommensurability, in the context of this Article, refers to the im-
possibility of comparing two goods, either in monetary or retributive
terms, without violating our considered judgments about how these
goods are best characterized. 67 Incommensurability occurs in situa-
tions in which things "cannot be compared in terms of 'better/worse'
and 'best.""'  The question in the context of this Article is whether it
is possible to establish a monetary sum that is commensurable to a
holder's "property" in her reputation, privacy, or other anti-speech
entitlements.1 69  By extension, this question asks whether prior re-
163. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion of the nexus between incommensurability and property and
liability rules, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
Mich. L. Rev. 779,845-46 (1994) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incommensurability].
165. See Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of
the World?, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683,683 [hereinafter Epstein, Utility].
166. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 164, at 780.
167. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 80 (1997) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Free Markets]; Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 164, at 796.
168. Brian Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy 96 (1993).
169. Cf Laycock, Irreparable Injury, supra note 2, at 246. Professor Laycock notes
that:
Money is an adequate remedy if, and only if, it can be used to replace the
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straints that would prohibit injurious speech are commensurable with
the subsequent monetary compensation victims receive under the cur-
rent liability rules.17
0
Incommensurability can be defined several ways, distinguishing
"radical incommensurability" from "moderate incommensurability,"
and "objective incommensurability" from "subjective incommensura-
bility." Radical and moderate incommensurability may each be objec-
tive or subjective. Subjective incommensurability may be further di-
vided into culturally specific incommensurability and purely rational
or idiosyncratic incommensurability. The following subsections ex-
amine these definitions and a number of possible sub-classifications of
them. The discussion will focus on entitlements to reputation and pri-
vacy, since these are particularly relevant to the private law applica-
tion of the doctrine of prior restraint.
A. Radical and Moderate Incommensurabilities
As defined by one commentator, "two valuable options are incom-
mensurable if (1) neither is better than the other, and (2) there is (or
could be) another option which is better than one but is not better
than the other.' 171 Situations may also arise in which the two options
are incommensurable without the existence of a third option that is
better than either one alone.17
A requirement of this last type of relationship reflects a radical ap-
proach to incommensurability. Radical incommensurability involves
the negation of the possibility of rational choice and even the com-
parison of different options.' 73 While cases of incommensurability in
this sense are relatively rare, they are possible and apparently also
exist in the context of personal subjective incommensurability.7'
There is also a more moderate approach to incommensurability.
specific thing that was lost. That is to say, money is never an adequate rein-
edy in itself. It is either a means to an end or an inadequate substitute that
happens to be the best courts can do at reasonable cost.
Id.
170. Criminal sanctions do not purport to be a substitute for the values impaired by
the commission of the offense. The punishment of an offender is certainly not com-
mensurable with restraining the commission of the offense. See Laycock, Irreparable
Injury, supra note 2, at 164-66. For a discussion of the question of whether the exis-
tence of criminal sanctions can justify the prohibition against prior restraints, see infra
part m.
It should be noted that the topic of this Article is not the incommensurability of
freedom of speech. That issue is discussed in Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra
note 164, at 829-34. Where substantive constitutional law protects speech, no means
may be used to impair that speech. This Article addresses only the question of
whether anti-speech entitlements-not pro-speech rights-are incommensurable.
171. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 325 (1986).
172. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 164, at 805-06.
173. See Sunstein, Free Markets, supra note 167, at 85.
174. See infra part II.B.
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Instead of requiring the absence of any possibility of a hierarchy of
options or of rational choice among them, it suffices that a single met-
ric does not exist on the basis of which it is possible to weigh the op-
tions.175 Cases of incommensurability in this sense are relatively rou-
tine-typical examples include human life, pain and suffering, and
injury to feelings.'76 People must choose between these values and
other values in a rational manner. Moreover, these values are regu-
larly expressed in monetary terms such as insurance rates and tort
damages.177 Nevertheless, it is not possible to measure these values in
accordance with a single metric, and they are not "negotiable" in the
usual sense. It is merely possible to choose between them, or to de-
termine sums of money as compensation for their loss. These choices,
however, are generally constrained, and they have a jarring impact
and an aura of unpleasantness that is preferably avoided.178
Anti-speech entitlements are usually incommensurable in the mod-
erate sense. Examples of entitlements of this type are the private
rights to reputation and privacy, 179 and the public interest in national
security.180 Indeed, a violation of these rights may be compensated by
money, and these rights can be weighed against other values, thus pre-
senting rational choices. At the same time, this evaluation cannot be
performed based upon a single metric, and the values are not negotia-
ble. Rather, the determination of compensation or the choice be-
tween two values is made only under duress and is jarring in nature.
B. Objective Incommensurabilities
Objective incommensurability occurs when the comparison be-
tween a number of options is impossible from a logical point of view.
In cases of objective incommensurability, it cannot be true that one of
two options is preferable to the other, or that the two are of equal
weight. Incommensurability of this type is exceptional because the
ranking of a given set of options generally depends on subjective as-
sessments. Such assessments are not shared by everyone, and by their
nature they are likely to be controversial. Objective incommensura-
bility requires the existence of objective rankings. It is therefore ar-
guable that objective incommensurability is an impossibility. 181
175. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 66-71 (1993); Sun-
stein, Incommensurability, supra note 164, at 808-12.
176. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903 cmt. a (1977); Margaret Jane Radin,
Compensation and Commensurability, 43 Duke L.J. 56, 69-71 (1993); Sunstein, In-
commensurability, supra note 164, at 845-46.
177. See Radin, supra note 176, at 60-62.
178. See infra part II.C.
179. See Posner, Economics of Justice, supra note 10, at 255-56,272.
180. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
181. Nevertheless, it is possible that incommensurabilities "result[ing] from vague-
ness and the absence of sharp boundaries which infect language generally" are a par-
tial example of objective incommensurabilities in the sense discussed above. Raz, su-
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The comparisons this Article discusses do not involve objective in-
commensurabilities. A rational person may believe that his privacy or
reputation is commensurable with money or other tangible benefits.
At the same time, there may be another reasonable person who be-
lieves that her privacy or reputation is not commensurable to any par-
ticular sum of money. If a publisher were to approach the latter per-
son in advance and ask her to enter into negotiations to "purchase"
their privacy or reputation, she would refuse to negotiate. Because
rational people could believe that a certain value was either commen-
surable or incommensurable, this is not a case of objective incommen-
surability.
C. Subjective Incommensurability and the Doctrine of Prior
Restraint
Is there room to consider subjective incommensurability when de-
termining the protection that should be given to an entitlement? One
could argue that society must allocate material resources among vari-
ous objectives, despite the unpleasantness or disturbance created in
the process. Thus, while "many people find it jarring to hear that, in
light of actual occupational choices, a worker values his life at (say) $8
million,"182 this does not negate the need for determinations of this
type. Not only is any other approach impracticable, but the valuation
of human life as equal to unlimited sums of money assumes the le-
gitimacy of valuing human life in terms of money. This contradicts the
claim that human life and money are incommensurable in the radical
sense.is
3
From a more general perspective, liability rules are based on the
commodification of interests that are likely not to be commodifiable
from the point of view of the parties concerned. Subjective incom-
mensurability is not linked to any specific interests or values. From
the subjective perspective of a particular person, every interest or
value may be incommensurable to money.
Ultimately, the state does not coerce any person to convert interests
or values which he considers incommensurable into money. If a per-
son's entitlements have been taken from her, she has the option, or
the power, to obtain monetary compensation for the injury. Possibly,
this is also true with respect to radical incommensurability, which does
pra note 171, at 327.
182. Sunstein, Free Markets, supra note 167, at 84.
183. Even if assessing the reputation or privacy of a person in monetary terms is
disturbing to many people, there is no other choice. When rights of reputation or pri-
vacy are violated, there is no reason to withhold compensation from those people for
whom reputation or privacy is commensurable. Even people who feel their reputa-
tions or privacy are incommensurable to money may be interested in compensation
for attendant marketable losses, such as loss of income from business that is attribut-
able to a privacy violation.
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not acknowledge the possibility of a process for choosing between in-
commensurable options.' 4 It is undoubtedly true with regard to mod-
erate incommensurability, which does not see an inherent contradic-
tion in having to choose between incommensurable options.1 5
D. Idiosyncratic Incommensurability and Cultural
Incommensurability
There are two possible approaches to the question of whether sub-
jectively incommensurable entitlements should be protected by liabil-
ity rules or property rules. On one hand, one could analyze all cases
in which the entitlement at issue was subjectively incommensurable,
even if that incommensurability was purely idiosyncratic. On the
other hand, one could limit one's analysis to those situations in which
the incommensurability, while subjective in the ontological sense, is
rooted in the accepted culture of the relevant community or society.
Because any entitlement may be incommensurable from an idiosyn-
cratically subjective point of view, adopting the first approach would
mean that every entitlement should be protected by property rules.16
This Article does not take a definitive stand in relation to this ap-
proach, as its substance falls within the scope of the second approach,
which applies to the more limited category of cases.
The second approach refers only to those subjectively incommensu-
rable entitlements that have a certain objective element, entitlements
whose incommensurability is anchored in social norms"' 7 These
norms are culturally dependent and are not based on logical analysis
or abstract conceptions."88 Following this approach, a damages award
by a court reflects a favorable opinion about an entitlement's com-
184. See supra part II.A.
185. See Sunstein, Free Markets, supra note 167, at 85-86. These arguments do not
promote avoidance of the problem of incommensurability when deciding between dif-
ferent modes of protecting entitlements. After all, there are means of protecting an
entitlement that preempt an injury and are intended to prevent it. These means
should be differentiated from the remedies that are awarded after the violation of an
entitlement and that are designed to compensate injured parties for the damage
caused to them. Even if there is no choice but to commodify values in monetary
terms when calculating ex post remedies, this is not the case when determining the
appropriate means of protecting an entitlement, when trying to preclude the injury
and not only to compensate for it. Sometimes the same means may fulfill both func-
tions. Liability rules, for instance, are intended to deter and to compensate concur-
rently.
186. This assumes that people would use judicial enforcement of their property
rights only in situations in which they actually did not want to sell, and not merely as
negotiating tactics. Cf. Ayres & Talley, Advantages, supra note 138, at 242-48 (arguing
that even according to the standard of economic efficiency propounded by Calabresi
and Melamed, it is not efficacious for a person to apply to a court for a restraint of
damage to his property if he intends to sell that property).
187. See Sunstein, Free Markets, supra note 167, at 85.
188. See id. at 85-86.
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mensurability."19 There are certain types of entitlements that society
regards as inherently negotiable and similar to money, such as rights
relating to fungible chattels.1 90 In contrast, there are entitlements that
are regularly considered incommensurable, despite the fact that the
incommensurability is non-essential, subjective, and does not preclude
necessary choices between different alternatives. Society disfavors,
and on occasion even prohibits, commerce in such entitlements. At
the very least, society demonstrates an understanding of those people
who refuse to participate in a market for these entitlements.19' Many
of these entitlements have personal or sentimental value, in the sense
of goods' 92 or intangible rights 93 that money cannot replace. The enti-
tlements to life and to good health exemplify this type of incommen-
surability.194
Even the entitlements to reputation and, to a great extent, privacy,
fall within this category. Notwithstanding their subjective and moder-
ate incommensurability, the prevailing cultural feeling is that con-
verting these entitlements to monetary terms is not entirely appropri-
ate, or at least that their exchange should not be compelled. This is
because money damages cannot replace a good reputation or privacy
once it has been lost, nor can money erase emotional distress once it
has been suffered. Reputation, privacy, and emotional tranquillity
cannot be purchased in the market.1 95 Incommensurability must
therefore be taken into account in determining the means that should
be used to ensure the rights to reputation and privacy, rights in the
name of which the First Amendment allows speech to be regulated.
The significance of the existing prohibition against prior restraint-
which confers on these entitlements the protection of liability rules
alone, and negates the possibility of protecting them with property
rules-is that it denies the existence of incommensurability. Citizens
are forced, in effect, to trade in their reputations and privacy for gov-
ernmentally-determined prices, despite widespread reservations about
the practice that are firmly rooted in the culture and morality of soci-
ety.
E. Commensurable Anti-Speech Entitlements as Exceptions to the
Prior Restraint Doctrine
Against this background, it is interesting to note that the prohibi-
tion against prior restraint does not apply to anti-speech entitlements
that are primarily of a commercial nature, in particular intellectual
189. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 164, at 843.
190. See Laycock, Irreparable Injury, supra note 2, at 4.
191. See id. at 41-42.
192. See id at 40-41, 45.
193. See id at 41.
194. See id.
195. See id at 165-66.
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property protections such as copyright, trade secrets, and trade-
marks.196
It is precisely entitlements of this type, after all, that are not gener-
ally deemed to be incommensurable. 197 They are customarily treated
as property, and their exchange in commerce is accepted. To a great
extent, intellectual property rights exist in order to enable their ex-
change. Nevertheless, the doctrine of prior restraint does not apply to
these entitlements, and generally they are protected by property rules.
Thus, it is possible to issue injunctions-including temporary re-
straining orders-in order to halt their violation.19
Judicial willingness to engage in prior restraint within the frame-
work of the protection of property or quasi-property rights1' mani-
fested itself in Snepp v. United States," in which the Court found that
a former government employee had breached a fiduciary obligation
by failing to submit his book to the CIA for pre-publication review. 201
The Court accordingly placed the book's earnings into a constructive
trust.2" The United States Government did not rely on the contention
that the book contained secret information.2 ~
The lack of theoretical consistency in prior restraint doctrine, illus-
trated by courts' willingness to engage in prior restraint to protect
commensurable entitlements, may conceal an assumption that the
holders of intellectual property are interested in negotiating its sale.
Accordingly, it may be that these entitlements should be protected by
property rules. In contrast, the typical holder of rights to reputation
and privacy may not be prepared to trade them. Thus, in order to en-
able their socially beneficial transfer, liability rules are put in place.
196. At the same time, the grant of an injunction to restrain the breach of copyright
is not automatic. When exercising the discretionary power to grant injunctive relief,
courts are likely to take into account First Amendment considerations. See Kwall, st-
pra note 138, at 64 and the sources referred to therein. For an argument justifying the
protection of the right of publicity (which contains commercial elements) through the
use of liability rules, see id. at 52-65.
197. Moral rights theories of intellectual property may present different issues. A
moral right, in the context of intellectual property, is the right of a creator to control
his creation so that it will not be changed or distorted in a way that may injure his
dignity. See Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists' Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U.
Pub. Int. L.J. 41, 44 (1998).
198. See Laycock, Irreparable Injury, supra note 2, at 121.
199. Some commentators compare freedom of speech itself to a property right. See
Epstein, Property, Speech, and Distrust, supra note 1, at 59-60.
200. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); see also Jonathan C. Medow, The First
Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 775,
777-82 (1982) (discussing the Supreme Court's affirmation of prior restraint for rea-
sons of national security); Orentlicher, supra note 76, at 662-66 (discussing the Court's
finding a fiduciary duty for the appellant to submit all publications concerning the
CIA for prior approval).
201. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510.
202. See id. at 515-16.
203. See id. at 508 (outlining the government's claims).
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At the same time, intellectual property, and in particular copyright,
is characterized by the fact that one of its purposes is to encourage
freedom of speech and democratic values. 4 Intellectual property re-
stricts certain aspects of freedom of speech in order to promote free-
dom of speech in general3m Intellectual property, therefore, does not
entail a limitation on freedom of speech solely to promote competing
values or interests. Indeed, while the doctrine of prior restraint is in-
tended to prevent curtailment of freedom of speech in favor of other
interests, the application of the doctrine to intellectual property leads
to the impairment of freedom of speech itself. Consequently, the pro-
speech elements of intellectual property may generate an argument
against the prohibition of prior restraint in this area.
This argument, however, is not particularly persuasive, nor does it
provide a suitable explanation for the non-application of the doctrine
of prior restraint to intellectual property. The doctrine of prior re-
straint is primarily based on two contentions, which apply to intellec-
tual property in the same ways as to other kinds of speech. The first
contention is that the collateral bar rule, which forbids raising consti-
tutional issues in contempt hearings, makes issuing anti-speech injunc-
tions problematic. This fear, however, exists to the same extent with
judicial injunctions or administrative orders issued against publica-
tions that purportedly violate intellectual property rights. The second
contention focuses on the harm that prior restraints cause to the
democratic nature of society. 06 This argument is not significantly
weakened in the intellectual property context, however, because one
of the rationales for the copyright regime is that it encourages speech.
It is therefore unclear why these arguments against the use of prior re-
straints are thought to be persuasive only outside the realm of intellec-
tual property.
As noted above, Calabresi and Melamed have argued that the test
for determining the type of protection that courts should confer on an
entitlement depends on the anticipated transaction costs associated
with the transfer of that entitlement.3 Courts will grant property-like
protection to an entitlement if negotiation and transaction costs are
low. It would seem that in the field of intellectual property, transac-
tion costs are generally low. In part, these low transaction costs result
from the fact that the intellectual property interest in a given work
tends to be found in the hands of one person or a limited number of
204. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
Yale LJ. 283,347 (1996).
205. Some commentators argue that the protection of intellectual property by
property rules actually harms freedom of speech considerably. See, eg., Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression Equality and Individualism in the Natu-
ral Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale LJ. 1533, 1538-39 (1993).
206. For a discussion of the relationship between prior restraint and democratic
values, see infra part M.
207. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1106.
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people. One who wishes to use the intellectual property can therefore
easily approach its owners and conduct negotiations with them
cheaply.
Similarly, in many cases the transaction costs involved in the trans-
fer of non-commercial anti-speech entitlements should not be espe-
cially high. An exception to this may be a photograph of a large group
of people, where purchasing each individual's privacy right could
prove expensive, especially under time pressure. Analogous cases ex-
ist in the context of commercial entitlements, however, so it is difficult
to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial anti-speech
entitlements on this ground alone.
III. ABSTRACTION, SELF-CENSORSHIP, AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES
This part discusses three interconnected arguments that unfavora-
bly compare prior restraints to ex post criminal and civil sanctions.
According to these arguments, the law should universally prefer ex
post sanctions to prior restraints because the former are less injurious
to First Amendment values. These arguments are not persuasive.
Prior restraints not only fare as well as subsequent sanctions in pro-
moting core democratic values, but at times, actually perform better.
A. Abstraction and Hypothetical Adjudication
When a court or an administrative authority is confronted with a
request for prior restraint, there is frequently no way for it to know
whether the publication in question would cause any damage if re-
leased. The situation is different when a court is weighing ex post
sanctions: because publication has already occurred, there is usually
clear data available indicating the damage caused. Some commenta-
tors have therefore argued that prior restraint is undesirable because
it amounts to adjudication in the abstract.2 8 This argument, despite its
intuitive strength,209 is problematic and difficult to accept.
First, speakers are often retrospectively sanctioned for speech that
was only dangerous "in the abstract" at the time it was spoken. The
same level of abstraction that would prohibit prior restraints would
also prohibit ex post sanctions, because if it is impossible for the state
to determine the dangerousness of speech in advance than it must also
be impossible for individual speakers to do so. The abstraction argu-
ment does not concern the means used to regulate unprotected speech
per se, but the question of whether particular kinds of speech are pro-
tected.210 This is a substantive constitutional issue, not one that can be
208. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 49-54.
209. See Redish, supra note 29, at 66.
210. See id. at 68-70 and the examples set out there; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 853, 864 (1991) (discussing examples of
categories of speech "completely beyond First Amendment protection").
[Vol. 68
PRIOR RESTRAINT
handled through the constitutionalism of means. The Constitution
may indeed limit the state's power to impose abstract restrictions on
freedom of speech. This fact, however, is not logically related to the
prohibition against prior restraint.
Second, as noted above, criminal law generally requires that the
person committing an act have a particular mental state at the time of
the act.2 ' Particularly with respect to inchoate offenses, criminal law
generally affords determinative weight neither to the question of
whether the intended damage actually occurred, nor to whether any
concrete damage could have occurred.22 The actual damage question
is relevant only for the purpose of classifying the act as an attempt or
a completed offense.213 This emphasis on mental elements, as op-
posed to actual harm, in the criminal law follows from criminal law's
objectives: retribution and deterrence.2 4 In contrast, the sole purpose
of prior restraint is the prevention of harmful speech that is not enti-
tled to First Amendment protection. The effect of rejecting the possi-
bility of prior restraint in any case where anticipated damage was at
all uncertain would be to give absolute preference to freedom of
speech over all other interests and values, despite the contrary lan-
guage of the Constitution. Society would have to bear all risks neces-
sary to guarantee freedom of speech. This approach is inconsistent
with the belief that freedom of speech is not absolute. Moreover, this
approach entails an inconsistency between the constitutionalism of
means and substantive constitutional theory. While this Article ar-
gues that a high degree of proof of the damaging nature of an expres-
sion must be demonstrated before that expression may be re-
strained, 215 this position is distinct from saying that any reliance on
predictive hypotheticals makes prior restraint untenable.
Third, in certain speech offenses the amount of damage caused by
publication is not one of the elements of the offense; rather, the
speech itself is prohibited.2 6 There is no purpose to prohibiting prior
restraint of these types of speech when, even in the absence of dam-
age, publication alone constitutes a completed offense.2 7
Fourth, the damage that will be caused by a particular expression is
often clear from the content of the speech itself, and there is no need
211. See infra part IV.C.
212- See Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 395-423 (1991).
213. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 Stan. L Rev. 681,750 (1983) (pro-
viding an example of applying the actual damage analysis to attempted murder).
214. See infra part IV.
215. Cf Redish, supra note 29, at 67 (stating that the government bears the burden
of demonstrating that the expression to be restrained presents a significant danger).
216. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 50 (noting examples of the current doctrines re-
garding obscenity and fighting words).
217. See Redish, supra note 29, at 68-69 (noting that "the only speech which could
be punished is speech which has actually led to provable harm").
1999]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
for speculation about future developments. These cases include dis-
closures of national security secrets, defamations, and disclosures of
commercial secrets.2 18 There is no reason to deny prior restraint based
on abstraction under these circumstances.
Subsequent sanctions actually appear more abstract than prior re-
straints in significant respects.219 After all, prior restraints always refer
to specific, concrete expressions, whereas ex post sanctions are based
on the application of general norms. Speech regulations have had re-
curring problems with unconstitutional vagueness.220 They generally
do not refer to specific prohibited expressions, but rather to the ab-
stract characteristics of prohibited speech. On the basis of these laws,
a person might find it difficult to determine whether publication of a
particular expression would create exposure to sanctions in advance.
Similar vagueness also exists in the laws conferring the power of prior
restraint on the judiciary." In contrast, the issuance of a prior re-
straint at least enables an individual to know, prior to acting, whether
a planned publication is lawful.m2 This is particularly true in the case
of injunctive restraints that are subject to immediate judicial review.2 3
The iniquity of imposing sanctions upon a person who could not have
known in advance that his conduct was prohibited would not occur
under a prior restraint regime.
There may be cases in which a prohibition will be conditioned upon
a court or other competent authority imposing a specific prohibitive
norm. Such a prohibition is not a direct consequence of the law. In-
stead, the law confers power on a court or agency to use its discretion
in issuing restraints. 4  It is precisely the importance of freedom of
speech, and societal sensitivity to fears that it may be unduly re-
218. See id. at 69.
219. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 49.
220. Cf. Mayton, supra note 40, at 255-57 (discussing the problem of vagueness in
laws restricting speech).
221. Cf. Schauer, supra note 6, at 727-28 (discussing the vagueness of laws confer-
ring the power of prior restraint to administrative bodies).
222. See Mayton, supra note 40, at 277-78.
223. In this respect, it is also relevant to ask whether defying an order issued by a
competent administrative or judicial authority is a criminal offense when the authority
erred in issuing the order. The question is whether there is an obstacle to an indirect
attack on the constitutionality of an injunctive restraint during criminal proceedings
against the person who breached the restraint. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. 307, 315 (1967). Where the possibility of such an indirect attack exists, an indi-
vidual cannot know with certainty whether or not the publication will constitute an
offense. At the same time, of course, it is difficult to argue that publishers would suf-
fer as a result of being allowed to raise this defense. The situation would be different
if parties opposing a publisher could argue that publication of the expression was an
offense subject to sanctions despite the refusal of a competent authority to restrain
the expression on constitutional grounds. For a description of the issues surrounding
indirect attacks on decisions of this type, see infra part V.D.
224. See Fiss, Injunction, supra note 84, at 26-27 (describing the "injunctive proc-
ess.., as concentrating or fising the decisional power in the judge").
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stricted, that make individual discretionary review of judicial speech
regulation desirable. It is difficult to understand, then, why some
commentators would promote general, abstract, and vague speech re-
strictions.22 It is also hard to comprehend why they would argue
against legislative attempts to impose a duty upon courts to look
closely at an expression before restraining it.
For instance, in the sensitive constitutional balancing of First and
Sixth Amendment rights, it is probably inappropriate not to deter-
mine the extent of permitted publication ex ante, leaving the press to
"gamble" on the legality of any given publication. Our current regime
focuses on the wrong questions. In such a situation, the critical issue is
whether a court may prohibit a concrete publication, not whether the
press should be subject to sanction according to some general norm.
The tools of prior restraint, including the ability to issue precise in-
junctions, can handle such a task most effectively and sensitively.2
There is no need, for example, to impose any restrictions upon me-
dia coverage of criminal trials. If there are circumstances that justify
the imposition of speech restrictions, it would be more proper to en-
force them by means of restraining the publication of the pertinent
expressions than by punishing the publishers.
Nevertheless, the demand for individuated imposition of restric-
tions does not obviate the legislature's duty to specify standards to
govern discretionary speech restrictions.m Conferring the power to
decide whether or not to prevent a publication upon a court or ad-
ministrative agency does not conflict with the rule against the delega-
tion of legislative powerim any more than the discretion given to
prosecutors or courts in sentencing. The legislature must set the stan-
dards for authorities to use in hearing an application for a restraint,
but this does not mean that the legislature cannot also mandate an in-
dividuated, discretionary hearing.
B. Self-Censorship
A central consideration in determining the means that should be
used to regulate unprotected speech is the amount of self-censorship
of protected speech that may occur. On the margins, the existence of
any speech regulation will cause potential publishers to refrain from
publishing some amount of protected speech. This unnecessary deter-
rence is problematic because of the high social value we place on
freedom of speech as a means of collective self-determination and
225. See, eg., id. at 70 (arguing that "[i]ndividuation is the antithesis of over-
breadth; it is the means of containing the 'chilling effect' of a prohibition").
226. For an opposite view, however, see Bernabe-Rietkohl, supra note 45, at 267.
227. Cf Tribe, supra note 29, at 1055 (arguing that the authority to determine what
speech is protected rests finally within the scope and power of the judiciary).
228. For a description of the non-delegation doctrine, see Stephen G. Breyer et al.,
Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 39-70 (4th ed. 1999).
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public enlightenment. Reluctance to publish protected speech injures
not only the hesitant speaker, but also society in general.
The scope of private censorship threatens to grow particularly wide
when it is imposed on speakers by media corporations or publishing
houses, which often have no interest in placing themselves at risk in
order to guarantee that their employees' ideas are heard. Unlike state
censorship, private censorship is not subject to judicial review, 2 9 and it
typically occurs outside the bounds of public scrutiny. The extent of
private censorship is therefore unknown.
The regulation of unprotected speech undoubtedly causes some
damage to speech that is protected by the First Amendment. The ap-
propriate question, therefore, is what means of regulating speech will
restrict unwanted, unprotected speech most effectively while causing
the least damage to protected speech.
One of the most common arguments against the prior restraint of
speech is that such procedures inevitably lead to overly broad self-
censorship."0 Potential publishers, the argument goes, will be de-
terred by the unpleasantness and expense of prior restraint to the ex-
tent that they will refrain from publishing constitutionally protected
speech. 1 "It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor
but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes
the danger to freedom of discussion. ' ' 2
This argument is largely based on the contention that prior restraint
functions "in the abstract," as discussed above. Essentially, it ex-
presses a fear that because it is impossible to be one hundred percent
sure ex ante when prior restraint will be exercised, publishers will
avoid the publication of borderline speech so as to avoid having it re-
strained. As discussed above, 3 however, this contention does little to
distinguish prior restraints from ex post sanctions; presumably, the
lack of certainty about future sanctions should lead to self-censorship
under both regimes.
The deterrent effect of criminal and civil sanctions may lead to self-
censorship of desirable speech that is broader than that caused by
prior restraints.' The specter of a criminal sanction may induce a
publisher to leave a wider margin of error than the imposition of a
prior restraint. Moreover, because ex post sanctions involve the appli-
cation of general norms while prior restraints act on specific expres-
229. See Mayton, supra note 40, at 268, 277.
230. See id. at 275-78.
231. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 24-49; Steven T. Catlett, Note, Enjoining Obscenity
as a Public Nuisance and the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1616, 1627-
28 (1984).
232. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1939) (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697,713 (1931)).
233. See supra part III.A.
234. See Mayton, supra note 40, at 253-54; Schauer, supra note 6, at 728.
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sions, the former may lead to greater amounts of self-censorship than
the latter.
It should be clear, however, that self-censorship is one of the goals
of any system of speech regulation. The objective, however, is to en-
courage self-censorship of harmful, unprotected speech while encour-
aging protected speech. The problem is that the two goals are often
confused in the minds of potential speakers. The advantage of prior
restraints over subsequent sanctions in this regard is that their speci-
ficity gives speakers a fair degree of certainty about the legality of a
particular expression.2 This certainty may actually encourage discus-
sion because it wiU give speakers peace of mind, allowing those who
desire to "steer far [wide] of the unlawful zone"' to do so. The pub-
lisher of constitutionally protected speech views the "censor," whether
an administrative agency or a court, not as a barrier to speech, but
rather as a source of certainty and protection. A publication that has
passed the "censor" is absolutely and fully protected. In contrast, un-
der a regime dominated by ex post sanctions, a publisher is always ex-
posed to liability based upon past publications.
For example, if a court imposes monetary sanctions on a funding
source that contributed to an art exhibition that was later found to be
obscene, the funding source may hesitate before financing another
avant-garde exhibition. The self-censorship and damage to First
Amendment values in this case are much greater than in the case in
which the "obscenity" of a given exhibition is determined in advance,
because the speaker or financier can be confident that the speech in
question is absolutely protected.P There is no disincentive to funding
cutting-edge performances when speech regulations are determined in
advance.
Most self-censorship arguments presented are anecdotal or intui-
tive, without empirical support. Some commentators even argue that
there is no such thing as self-censorship distinct from governmental
censorship.238 In any case, without compelling empirical evidence,
self-censorship arguments in no way justify the decision to protect
anti-speech entitlements through liability rules alone.
C. Reservations About Prior Restraint That Extend Beyond Speech
Another argument advanced in favor of the doctrine of prior re-
straint holds that it is necessary to generally limit the exercise of prior
restraints in a liberal democratic society. According to this line of
thought, concerns over the prior restraint of speech are only one ex-
235. See Schauer, supra note 6, at 729.
236. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,526 (1958).
237. See Fiss, State Activism, supra note 16, at 2094.
238. See Steven Alan Childress, The Empty Concept of Self-Censorship, 70 Tul. L.
Rev. 1969,1971 (1996).
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ample of a broader disfavoring of prior restraints: as serious viola-
tions of liberty239 that are difficult to reconcile with our conceptions of
limited government. 24° One commentator suggests that the general
reservation about prior restraints manifests itself not only in the First
Amendment, but also in the Fourth Amendment's provision of the
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. 241
The rejection of preventative detention or arrest, even when impor-
tant interests are thereby put at risk, is an example of the general re-
luctance to use prior restraints. It is widely accepted that a person's
liberty cannot be physically constrained except as punishment for an
offense that he or she has committed.242 The apparently contradictory
use of prior restraints in the speech context proposed in this Article
must therefore be explained.
Despite courts' traditional aversion towards preventative arrest and
detention, in recent years they have increasingly circumvented this
outright prohibition. The Supreme Court has recognized the constitu-
tionality of many of the methods used to accomplish this. For exam-
ple, until 1984, a defendant on trial for past offenses could not be kept
in federal prison out of a fear that he or she might commit more of-
fenses if released.243 Congress changed this rule with the enactment of
the Bail Reform Act,2' which the Supreme Court upheld in United
States v. Salerno.245 Under the Act, the government may keep a de-
fendant incarcerated if it can prove by "clear and convincing evi-
dence" that he or she will commit further offenses if released.246
Further, courts have recognized for generations that mentally ill
persons may be incarcerated against their will to prevent them from
doing harm to themselves or their surroundings.247 This traditional,
although not uncontroversial, 248 doctrine has been extended in many
states to include the power to civilly commit people who, as a result of
mental abnormalities or personality disorders, are likely to engage in
239. See Fiss, Injunction, supra note 84, at 68.
240. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 69-85. Blasi's argument focuses on prior restraint
of speech, but the essence of his comments is also relevant to the prior restraint of
other activities. See also Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 Wash.
U. L.Q. 145, 159-64, 181-85 (1995) (arguing that courts have difficulty issuing injunc-
tions or prohibitory remedies).
241. See Amar, supra note 74, at 71-72.
242. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV,
87 Colum. L. Rev. 920, 934 (1987).
243. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,742 (1987).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 3141-3156 (1994).
245. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
246. See id. at 751.
247. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-59 (1997).
248. See George A. Huber et. al., Hospitalization, Arrest, or Discharge: Important
Legal and Clinical Issues in the Emergency Evaluation of Persons Believed Dangerous
to Others, 45 L. & Contemp. Probs. 99, 99 (1982).
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acts of sexual violence.2 49 It is difficult to justify this policy's exclusive
application to sex-offenders, rather than a general inclusion of all
violent habitual offenders. The relevance of whether a mental disor-
der causes the criminal tendency is also unclear.
Finally, state statutes in Californiam and Washington21' and new
federal statutes,2 2 provide for life imprisonment of habitual offenders.
These statutes are intended to prevent people who have been proven
to be dangerous from repeating their offenses. Various petitions at-
tacking the constitutionality of these statutes have been rejected. -
The logic behind these statutes is problematic. Instead of directly ex-
amining the justification for incarcerating a given individual on the
basis of the danger he or she poses to society, a mechanical procedure
based on the number of offenses he or she has committed is used,
which may lead to arbitrary results.
The rejection of preventative arrest as an appropriate method of
criminal regulation therefore involves difficulties similar to those we
saw in prior restraint doctrine. In both cases, there is a danger that
courts will focus too narrowly on a body of doctrine regulating a set of
means, in the process losing sight of the substantive constitutional
concerns that the doctrine in question was originally intended to pro-
tect.
The doctrine of prior restraint, which purports to protect freedom
of speech, actually does little to promote First Amendment values.
The same is true of the doctrine of preventative arrest, which is in-
tended to protect physical liberty but in all likelihood increases the
number of times that individuals' liberty rights are trampled. These
doctrines have undercut the policies that they were formulated to im-
plement.
Even if the general reservations about prior restraint are well
founded, prior restraint of speech is unique in two respects that may
justify it's use even in those circumstances in which prior restraint of
conduct usually appears problematic. First, prior restraint of speech
takes pre-existing speech as its object. The publication, rather than
the creation, of the speech is being restrained. Therefore, the sub-
stance and content of the speech in question is almost always already
determined. There is no need to speculate about future conduct in the
speech context, as is required in a case of preventative arrest. While it
249. The Supreme Court has confirmed the constitutionality of such practices. See
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371; Stephen R. McAllister, "Punishing" Sex Offenders, 46
Kan. L. Rev. 27, 47-54 (1997); Thomas J. Weilert, Thoughts on the Cost of Freedom,
46 Kan. L. Rev. 17,19 (1997).
250. See Cal. Penal Code § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999).
251. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.392(2) (West 1998).
252. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13701-
14223 (1994).
253. See Meredith McClain, Note, "Three Strikes and You're Out": The Solution to
the Repeat Offender Problem?, 20 Seton Hall Legis. J. 97, 114-16 (1996).
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is problematic to restrain individual liberty on the basis of speculative
assertions about future conduct, this difficulty does not arise when the
object of the restraint is an expression whose content is known. The
only question is whether the expression enjoys full First Amendment
protection.
In certain cases, of course, the latter question will involve an exami-
nation of the anticipated consequences of publication, such as its ef-
fects on public safety. One could argue that these assessments are un-
necessary in an ex post regime, and that ex post sanctions only
penalize publications that caused actual damage. Adding an "actual
damage" component to speech regulations, however, does nothing to
remedy the incommensurability and externality problems described
above ,5 because there would still be no adequate remedy available
when actual damage did occur.
Second, prior restraint of speech can be distinguished from prior re-
straint generally in that it focuses on particular expressions. The only
freedom that the prior restraint of an expression limits is the freedom
to publish that expression. Even to label this a "freedom" is mislead-
ing, because the speech in question was never constitutionally pro-
tected to begin with. The side effects of prior restraints on speech are
therefore relatively limited. In contrast, arresting a person in order to
prevent that person from committing future offenses destroys that
person's liberty entirely-she has become a prisoner. In prison, al-
most all of a person's rights are limited in some way, including those
rights that bear no rational relationship to the harms against which so-
ciety was trying to protect.
IV. PRIOR RESTRAINT AND CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal law prohibits conduct that endangers society's interests to
the extent that tort law is insufficient to do so 5 5 Criminal law targets
those forbidden and harmful acts that society absolutely disfavors.
Criminal regulations usually take the form of inalienability rules, be-
cause criminal forms of conduct are non-negotiable. 6 It is not possi-
ble to "purchase" from one's victim the right to commit a criminal act.
A. The Dstinction Between Two Types of Offenses
Criminal law, unlike civil law, does not seek to protect private enti-
tlements in and of themselves. Its purpose is the protection of social
interests as a whole. 7 Criminal and civil prior restraints therefore
254. See supra parts I.C.4, II.
255. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum.
L. Rev. 1193, 1201 (1985).
256. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three's a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi
and Melamed's One View of the Cathedral, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 394, 500 (1999).
257. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
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may present different questions. A law and economics approach may
or may not prove helpful in the criminal context.
This Article's analysis divides criminal speech regulations into two
categories. The first contains those criminal laws that include the lack
of the victim's consent as one of their elements. The second category
encompasses those acts that are criminal regardless of whether or not
the victim gave her consent.
1. Offenses Contingent Upon the Lack of Consent of the Victim
In the United States, the number of criminal speech regulations that
deal with harm to individuals, instead of harm to national security or
public morals, is small. There are a few examples of criminal offenses,
however, where the lack of the victim's consent is an element of the
crime.' s Without the doctrine of prior restraint, it would not be diffi-
cult to conclude that this kind of speech regulation confers the protec-
tion of property rules on the holders of these entitlements. They may
determine the price of the entitlements, and are free not to sell them
at all.
The conclusion that criminal law provides protection through prop-
erty rules is surprising. The doctrine of prior restraint itself differenti-
ates between means of prior restraint (which are property rules) and
expost criminal sanctions- 59 Perhaps, then, the protection that crimi-
nal law provides is actually achieved through liability rules, because
criminal sanctions are dictated by the state rather than determined by
negotiations between the offender and the victim. After all, a person
is free to use the intellectual property of another if she is willing to
bear the criminal sanctions determined by the state.
This contention, however, is not persuasive. Property rules com-
prise means of protecting entitlements, but they do not provide the
holder of the entitlement with absolute physical immunity from injury.
When the property right is impaired, criminal sanctions and liability
rules arise as additional lines of defense. The defenses that the crimi-
nal law provides, however, do not consist only of subsequent sanc-
tions. As explained below, criminal law protections also include
means of prior restraint, and a criminal prohibition may form the basis
for an injunction.m More importantly, unlike a classic liability rule,
the serving of a criminal punishment does not confer on the offender
any rights whatsoever in the intellectual property of the victim. Its
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale LJ. 1795, 1807 (1992); Pearl, supra note 67, at 288-
89; Seidman, supra note 67, at 337-38.
25& See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994 & Supp. IH 1997) (defining the crime of copy-
right infringement).
259. See Scordato, supra note 29, at 11.
260. In civil law, too, anti-speech entitlements that are classified as property
rights-such as copyright-are free of the prohibition against prior restraint. See su-
pra part I.C.
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transfer continues to require the consent of the property owner. The
continued possession of the entitlement by its original holder, and the
criminality of any future violations, demonstrate that a property re-
gime is actually in place.
If the prohibition against prior restraints was really enforced in this
context, neither the requirement of consent contained in criminal laws
of this variety nor the actions taken to enforce those laws would ever
be constitutional. The police would not be entitled to confiscate inju-
rious materials or preemptively arrest offenders, and courts would not
be competent to issue injunctions against future commission of the of-
fending act.
The application of the doctrine of prior restraint in this context
would therefore send contradictory messages and lead to an absurd
conclusion. On one hand, the criminal law would make the publica-
tion of certain expressions conditional on the consent of the person
likely to be injured by the publication. On the other hand, the system
would allow the expressions to be published even without consent,
and would be powerless to stop such publication. Using property
rules to protect an entitlement but not allowing those rules to actually
function would be useless. The few criminal regulations in this cate-
gory therefore generally fall within the exceptions to the prohibition
against prior restraints.
2. Offenses That Are Not Contingent Upon the Lack of Consent of
the Victim
Most criminal speech offenses are not dependent upon the absence
of the victim's consent, or do not have a specific victim at all. Exam-
ples of speech offenses of this type are solicitation of murder, or of
any other offense, and the publication of obscene material.2 1 Regula-
tions of this type reflect inalienability rules.262 The prohibition against
prior restraints means that it is permissible to penalize these speech
crimes, but not to prevent the acts from being committed.
The difference between these offenses and those described above is
that they are not protected by property rules. The potential victim
does not have the power to sell his or her entitlement to the injuring
party. Some might argue that the doctrine of prior restraint, which
was adopted because liability rules are more efficient than property
rules, should not come into play in these cases because property rules
are not involved. This argument, however, is difficult to accept. In-
alienability rules express the public perception that the interests at is-
sue are so critical that even the consent of the victims cannot validate
their transfer. There is no logic to weakening a property rule regime
261. See Model Penal Code § 5.02 (1980) (defining criminal solicitation); id. § 251.4
(defining the crime of obscenity).
262. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1111-12.
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in cases in which the property in question has been deemed so valu-
able that it cannot be exchanged. Even if there were some justifica-
tion for prohibiting prior restraint of speech crimes in which the con-
sent of the victim was a mandatory element of the crime, such
justification would fail with respect to offenses that express inal-
ienability rules.
Another variation of this type of speech crime includes those of-
fenses in which an element of the crime is the non-authorization of the
speech in question by a particular state authority. An example is the
screening of a cinematic film that has not been authorized by a cen-
sor. At first glance, such offenses might be thought to express prop-
erty rules, not inalienability rules. After all, the authorizing body has
the power to determine if, and on what terms, the right will be trans-
ferred. The purpose of the authorizing entity, however, is to deter-
mine whether the expression harms a protected interest to an extent
that justifies its prohibition. This is a judicial function. The authoriz-
ing body is not the holder of the entitlement, but only the determiner
of its existence. This authority does not possess discretion to deter-
mine the "price" of the right in the way that courts do in a liability
rule context. Moreover, it does not determine the price in the way a
seller would in a property rule context. Censorship regimes of this va-
riety therefore actually function by means of inalienability rules.
B. The Problem of Punishment Without Prevention
In the criminal context, some of the justifications for the doctrine of
prior restraint are problematic. The most common argument is that
ex post sanctions are preferable to prior restraints because restraints
prevent the publication of speech entirely, thereby limiting output in
the marketplace of ideas. In contrast, subsequent sanctions allow so-
ciety to enjoy the benefits of speech without denying compensation to
those who suffer harm from it.'
It is absurd, however, to criminalize the publication of speech based
upon its harmful effect upon society while concurrently establishing a
rule that enables its publication on the grounds that publication bene-
fits society.2 There may be a variety of opinions about whether any
particular expression is desirable and deserving of First Amendment
protection; these opinions may even change over time3' Society,
263. In practice it has been held-as an exception to the prohibition on prior re-
straint-that the administrative censorship of cinematic films in order to prevent the
screening of obscene films is not unconstitutional, provided that certain requirements
of due process and swift judicial review are met. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51,58-59 (1964).
264. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 47, at 970.
265. See Redish, supra note 29, at 59-60.
266. Cf. Blasi, supra note 27, at 51 (arguing that the dissemination of speech be-
comes a "fait accompli" and that "[t]he world is a slightly different place" as a result).
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however, must be able to determine whether a publication is permit-
ted or prohibited at any point in time, and whether its restriction is
constitutional or unconstitutional. If a given expression is categorized
as unconstitutional, it makes no sense to deny society the means nec-
essary to regulate it. Constitutional means must conform to substan-
tive constitutional goals.
Moreover, the argument that restraints should be forbidden be-
cause they deny certain benefits to society, while those who publish
unprotected speech should be punished, contains certain moral flaws.
The publisher becomes a tool used to produce societal benefits, yet is
deemed a criminal offender and forced to pay for the damages in-
curred as byproducts of his socially beneficial actions. The Kantian
school of thought, for example, identifies an absolute moral prohibi-
tion against such violations of human dignity.2 67 Even those who do
not believe in the absolute right to Kantian dignity, however, should
agree that this system requires an explanation. Such justification,
however, is difficult to find. As a rule, if society is unwilling to pre-
vent speech despite the damage that it may cause out of a fear of los-
ing the benefits of that speech, it should also refrain from imposing
penalties on the speakers.
Furthermore, punishment, despite its centrality in criminal law, is
only one of its objectives. In addition to retribution, prevention of fu-
ture offenses is a primary goal of criminal law.268 The deterrent effect
of punishment for past offenses is one method of achieving this goal;
prior restraint is another. Both means are integral parts of the crimi-
nal legal system, and prohibiting one of them impairs the effectiveness
of the whole system. The function of the police is not only to solve
crimes that have already been committed, but to frustrate the commis-
sion of future crimes. 69 Outside of the speech context, it would be un-
thinkable to argue that police officers, upon learning that a crime is
about to be committed, should have to sit and wait for the crime to
occur,270 instead of preventing the crime and arresting the perpetra-
tors.
But see Redish, supra note 29, at 60 (stating that the "difference" is not of "constitu-
tional magnitude").
267. Thus, according to Kantians there is a categorical imperative against using an-
other person as a means instead of as an end. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practi-
cal Reason (Mary Gregor trans., 1997).
268. See Pearl, supra note 67, at 273; Seidman, supra note 67, at 334-35.
269. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
270. The answer to the question of whether the doctrine of prior restraint only
prohibits censorship of speech prior to publication, or also prohibits the forced cessa-
tion of publication that has already been commenced, is dependent on the centrality
that one attributes to the collateral bar rule. The collateral bar rule does not preclude
indirect attacks on the constitutionality of infringements of freedom of speech if the
infringement in question has been carried out by a competent authority after the
commencement of the publication. Thus, following the rationale of the collateral bar
rule, it is doubtful whether there is "prior restraint" in an infringement of this sort.
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Some types of criminal sanctions, such as conditional sentences, are
themselves prior restraints. Fear that a speech offense is about to be
committed does not generally justify the arrest of a potential speaker,
but courts may well be interested in imposing conditional sentences
upon people who have already been convicted of such offenses. In
other words, a court could hold that if a defendant is ever again con-
victed of the same speech offense he will be sanctioned with a prede-
termined fine or a fixed term of imprisonment. Such a sentence is, in
substance, a prior restraint. The only difference between this and a ju-
dicial injunction-which is defined as an unconstitutional prior re-
straint-is that injunctions tend to be more specific than conditional
sentences. Consistency would therefore argue that the doctrine of
prior restraint prohibits the imposition of conditional sentences in re-
spect of speech offenses.271 Such a rule, however, would hamper the
effective conduct of criminal trials and would also cause defendants to
suffer, because conditional sentences are generally lighter than imme-
diately effective ones.' A court that is precluded from imposing
conditional imprisonment may be forced to impose actual imprison-
ment on the defendant, even if it believes that conditional imprison-
ment would be more appropriate on the merits.
C. The Requirement of Mens Rea
Criminal liability generally contains a mental element: it must be
shown that an actor was aware of his conduct and the circumstances in
which it was performed.m Sometimes the prosecutor must also prove
that the actor intended to achieve the harmful result. 7' Only in ex-
ceptional cases, where the protected value is of particularly critical
importance, is criminal liability imposed for mere negligence 5 Neg-
ligence imposes a reasonableness standard; conduct that is "unreason-
able" is therefore sometimes also considered criminal." 6 The Consti-
tution limits the state's power to create strict liability offenses; that is,
271. This difficulty might be resolved, and conditional sentences may be allowed
for speech offenders, if one's rationale for the doctrine of prior restraint is the desire
not to allow infringement of freedom of speech in the absence of a jury verdict. Ac-
cording to this rationale, an injunction may not be issued against a publication be-
cause this relief is given by a judge without jury participation. In contrast, a jury par-
ticipates both in the criminal trial in which the conditional sentence has been imposed
and the criminal trial in which implementation of this sentence is requested. How-
ever, the jury rationale for the doctrine of prior restraint is a poor one and should not
be regarded as a sufficient basis for the doctrine.
272. See Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and its Proc-
esses 97-98 (6th ed. 1995).
273. See Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. Cal. L Rev.
953, 958-59 (1998).
274. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L Rev.
1097, 1108-10 (1952).
275. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (1985).
276. See Lloyd L Weinreb, Criminal Law 269 (6th ed. 1998).
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offenses that do not include a mental element.277
Pragmatic objectives, such as deterrence, and moral concerns, such
as retribution, demand that criminal liability be made contingent upon
the existence of a mental element.278 The required mental element,
however, is usually separable from the value that the criminal law is
seeking to protect. For example, in homicide, the act of killing is in no
way logically dependent upon the existence of a given mental state.
The reason behind the inclusion of mental elements in criminal of-
fenses is not that no damage would have occurred without the requi-
site mental state-the victim is dead regardless of what the killer was
thinking-but that the deterrent and retributive calculations differ
with the mental state of the perpetrator. 9 Without a requirement of
intent, or wantonness, or willfulness, punishment may lack a deterrent
quality. Punishment would then be both ineffective and immoral.
The requirement of mens rea detracts from the criminal law's effi-
ciency, in that it takes the focus off of the protection of the values and
interests that criminal law is supposed to protect.? As a result, crimi-
nal sanctions do not provide as much protection as they possibly
could.
D. Cases in Which It Is Not Appropriate To Impose Criminal
Liability
Criminal sanctions are the most severe sanctions that society can
impose on a person, both in terms of the restrictions that they place
on his freedoms and the damage they do to his reputation. An unpro-
tected publication may not cause enough harm to warrant criminal
punishment, even if it was made with the requisite state of mind. So-
ciety may want to prevent these expressions from being published
without convicting their publishers or branding them as criminals. For
example, preventing the publication of commercial secrets may be
eminently justifiable,.21 but it would not be appropriate to make such
277. See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 828, 830
(1999).
278. See R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Ac-
tion and the Criminal Law 8-11 (1990).
279. See Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemp-
tion: A Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. Rev. 101, 103-06 (1997).
280. In the case of a homicide, for example, this value is the victim's life. Further-
more, the threat of criminal sanctions is ineffective against people who are willing to
risk punishment, either because they assume that they will not be caught or because
the anticipated punishment is lower than the gain, concrete or ideological, that they
expect to achieve from the offense. In the words of Mayton, "The calculus of deter-
rence includes the magnitude of punishment multiplied by the probability of punish-
ment." Mayton, supra note 40, at 266.
281. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,36-37 (1984). For a discussion
of the propriety of preventing a third party from engaging in publication, see Giles T.
Cohen, Comment, Protective Orders, Property Interests and Prior Restraints: Can the
Courts Prevent Media Nonparties from Publishing Court-Protected Discovery Materi-
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publication a criminal offense.
Even when an act of publication fulfills the requirements of a crimi-
nal offense, including mens rea, there may be situations in which
prosecuting the publisher would be undesirable, but preventing the
publication would still benefit society. This situation occurs, for ex-
ample, when the criminal provision at issue is vague or when there is a
factual or legal difficulty involved in determining whether it applies to
the publication in question. In such cases restraint of publication is
likely to be more justified than punishment, as it will achieve protec-
tive goals without unnecessarily stigmatizing the publisher. In the ab-
sence of prior restraint, however, courts may feel compelled to pro-
ceed with unnecessary criminal prosecutions.
V. PROCEDURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO PRIOR
RESTRAINT
The preceding sections of this Article demonstrated that there is no
consistent and compelling reason for the overriding prohibition
against prior restraints in First Amendment law. This part will exam-
ine some of the procedural and institutional aspects of American law
that are frequently mentioned as alternative grounds for the necessity
of a prohibition against prior restraints. Despite first appearances,
however, these concerns about administrative law, the judicial injunc-
tive power, evidentiary and procedural rules, and the collateral bar
rule do not justify the persistence of prior restraint doctrine.
A. Administrative Law Concerns
As noted above, the original target of prior restraint doctrine was
administrative censorship~m Commentators still view an administra-
tive agency's attempt to restrain speech more harshly than similar ac-
tions undertaken by a court.283 The reason for holding bureaucratic
restraints in particular disfavor, however, does not appear to be
rooted in the notion that an administrative restraint of an expression
injures freedom of speech more gravely than judicial prior restraint of
the very same expression. Rather, the fear is that bureaucrats wiUl ex-
ercise their power of prior restraint in more cases than the courts, and
will thereby impair freedom of speech without justification.
als?, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2463,2481-503 (1996).
282. See supra part I.C.2.
283. Indeed, in the past, no distinction was drawn between the two categories. See,
e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (stating that a statutory re-
quirement for judicially imposed restraint is "as obnoxious to the Constitution as one
providing for like restraint by administrative action"). A change has taken place in
this approach. Many scholars now distinguish between judicial prior restraints and
administrative prior restraints. See, e.g., Mayton, supra note 40, at 249-53 (arguing
that bureaucratic censorship is subject to greater scrutiny than judicial restraints).
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There are several reasons for this belief. First, administrative per-
sonnel tend to be interested in certain government policies that would
benefit from the restraint of some kinds of speech,2 84 and, for institu-
tional reasons, bureaucrats are eager to exercise their powers of cen-
sorship, in the same way that they are tempted to overuse their other
powers. 85 Second, the legislative standards implemented by adminis-
trative authorities are vague and imprecise and leave agencies signifi-
cant discretion to engage in broad censorship.26 Third, the administra-
tive process is not always public, and it is sometimes inquisitorial in
nature. The bureaucrat acts as both prosecutor and judge.287 Fourth,
the cost of administrative prior restraint is low, and therefore it is easy
to exercise. "Under a system of prior restraint, [a government official]
can reach the result by a simple stroke of the pen."' Fifth, prior re-
straints that take the form of administrative licensing schemes usually
apply to broad categories of expressions, such as the entire corpus of
cinematic films (or parades, etc.), and are not limited to concrete ex-
pressions.289 They may therefore be more harmful to a wide range of
speech.
Those who disfavor administrative prior restraints think that ad-
ministrative agencies pale in comparison to the courts. Courts are
sensitive to constitutional rights, and are willing to vindicate them
even at the expense of specific government objectives. Judicial discre-
tion is also narrower than administrative discretion, and it is exercised
according to standards provided by law. Moreover, the judicial proc-
ess does not operate against every pending publication, but only
against those that affected parties elect to try to restrain in court.
Court hearings are public, and are conducted in an adversarial manner
in which the judge is neutral and objective.
These contentions about administrative restraints focus on institu-
tional factors and not on substantive factors. They are similar to many
arguments raised against prior restraint in general, which are also in-
stitutional as opposed to substantive in nature. Some of the grounds
for the above contentions are dubious, lacking even serious intuitive
plausibility.2" There is no argument presented in favor of the creation
of a general administrative "prior restraint" mechanism that will pro-
hibit all publications that have not been bureaucratically approved
284. For the contention that the grant of powers to administrative authorities to
impair freedom of speech is contrary to the principle negating the empowerment of
bodies directly interested in the outcome of the case, see Redish, supra note 29, at 75-
83.
285. See Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note 34, at 659; Redish, supra note 29, at
73.
286. See Mayton, supra note 40, at 251.
287. See Redish, supra note 29, at 76-77.
288. Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note 34, at 657.
289. See id. at 655-56; Blasi, supra note 27, at 22.
290. See Redish, supra note 29, at 61.
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and licensed. It is difficult to dispute that such a system would lead to
the "self-censorship" of permitted expressions,29 and, even worse,
that it would make life insufferable. The real question is whether the
dismissal of such an all-encompassing totalitarian system2 necessarily
entails the claim that all forms of administrative prior restraint would
seriously damage constitutionally protected speech and the demo-
cratic nature of society. The answer to this question is a resounding
"no."
Most of the claims that disfavor administrative prior restraints are
just as pertinent with respect to administratively imposed ex post sanc-
tions, and therefore say little about prior restraint itselfV 3 Yet no one
is proposing that the executive authority be disbanded. Administra-
tive prior restraint is needed in order to implement substantive consti-
tutional arrangements. Judicial prior restraint does not suffice. The
subject matter of adjudication is not policy making but the settling of
disputes. Judicial prior restraint may therefore suffice in disputes
within the area of civil law, where one party wishes to obtain the assis-
tance of the judicial system against another party who wishes to vio-
late his rights.
In contrast, an administrative authority's decision to grant a prior
restraint is what generates a dispute in the first place. Indeed, a court
may examine the constitutionality of such a decision within the
framework of judicial review, but the judicial review is a reaction to
the administrative decision, not a substitute for it.
The aforesaid flaws, all of which are procedural, can easily be
remedied. Thus it is not appropriate, and more precisely, it is not con-
stitutional, to deviate from substantive constitutional arrangements
for reasons that are grounded in the incidental institutional structure
of a branch of government. As noted, a constitutionalism of means
must follow, in so far as possible, a system's substantive constitution-
alism.294 The existing procedures and structures must not be allowed
to dictate substantive constitutional arrangements: substantive consti-
tutional arrangements must dictate which governmental procedures
and structures exist.
291. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 28.
292. In the nineteenth century it was widely accepted that such a system could not
be created. See Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note 34, at 651.
293. The imposition of subsequent sanctions is generally classified as a judicial ac-
tivity, and it is assigned to the judicial authority. In practice, no serious problem has
arisen in relation to the exercise of punitive powers by administrative authorities.
Constitutional difficulties arise, however, when an independent agency not only deals
with implementation, but also with legislation and adjudication. See Stephen G.
Breyer et al., supra note 228, at 33. The accepted manner of dealing with this diffi-
culty is to construct the agencies in such a manner as to preserve an appropriate sepa-
ration between the judicial wing and other offices. A solution in this spirit is pro-
posed below.
294. See supra part I.
1999]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
A system could conceivably exist wherein administrative authori-
ties, like individuals, would be required to receive prior judicial
authorization for every restraint of expression. Such a system, how-
ever, would not conform to our expectations of the executive branch,
and it would lead to the publication of unprotected and harmful ex-
pressions in cases where the courts could not react quickly enough.
Moreover, it has been held that any move by a governmental agency
to regulate speech in advance of publication is a prior restraint, even
the mere adoption of a non-binding position that has not been physi-
cally enforced. This case law suggests that the very application by an
administrative authority to a court for an injunction against speech
would consist of a prior restraint.295
It is not possible to banish administrative prior restraint entirely
without deviating from substantive constitutional norms. A list of
recommendations follows, in which this Article proposes a system for
implementing substantive constitutional norms that does not require
the abolition of administrative prior restraint.
One accepted method for dealing with the special difficulties posed
by administrative prior restraint is to provide immediate judicial re-
view of administrative decisions. The Supreme Court has affirmed
this method with respect to the censorship of obscene films. 296 In this
scheme, the administrative authority is deemed competent to decide
on the prior restraint of an expression, provided that the authority it-
self brings the decision to a court for authorization without delay.297
One problem with this method is that it may permit the implementa-
tion of erroneous administrative prior restraints during the period be-
tween the agency's decision and review by the court.298 Manipulation
of the system may also lead to increased delays, but these procedural
concerns cannot be allowed to overwhelm constitutional limitations
on the freedom of speech.
When an authority is aware that its decision will be subjected to
immediate judicial review, it will carefully avoid reaching decisions
that do not meet substantive constitutional standards. Moreover, the
short period of time between the administrative decision and judicial
review will ensure that erroneous administrative decisions, if made,
will not remain in place for long. Finally, courts will be likely to issue
temporary restraining orders halting the execution of administrative
prior restraints that appear to be unconstitutional on their face even
before there is full judicial review of the restraint in question.
Another means of implementing administrative prior restraint that
295. See Helle, supra note 52, at 835 (discussing the Supreme Court's expansion of
the definition of measures as prohibited prior restraints).
296. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 374-75 (1971);
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,58 (1965).
297. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
298. For discussion of the problem of delay, see infra part V.E.
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would mitigate the harm done to protected expressions would be to
rely on media professionals who are committed to freedom of speech
and know the substantive constitutional laws to implement the proc-
ess, instead of leaving it in the hands of career bureaucrats299
The proposal is equally relevant when an administrative agency is
applying to a court for a restraint, a situation parallel to the applica-
tion by a prosecutor to the court for sanctions. The executive depart-
ment has to take into account not only interests such as national secu-
rity, but also the protection of constitutional human rights. In
deciding when to apply to the courts for a restraint, the executive
would be greatly aided by a professional body that was knowledgeable
in the relevant constitutional balances and that did not have a struc-
tural tendency in favor of any particular consideration.
Obviously, a professional military officer who identifies with certain
security objectives might find it difficult to properly fulfill the function
of a military censor, because that position requires the ability and
willingness to balance the needs of the military against freedom of
speech. Therefore, a more rounded, less interested party might per-
form the task better.
The ideal person, who is simultaneously a professional journalist, a
professional military officer, and a professional constitutional lawyer,
may be impossible to find. But it would be possible to form a panel or
a council comprised of people with all of these skills. It would be bet-
ter if participating professionals were not civil servants, but rather
professional journalists who would fulfill the function for fixed periods
of time. In an administrative agency reviewing pornographic materi-
als, professional bureaucrats could share power with creators and art-
ists, criminologists, psychologists, and other experts. Of course, con-
sideration must be given to the structural aspects of such panels to
ensure their independence. Fixed terms of service and exclusive re-
view by judicial bodies, for example, could satisfy this concern.
This proposal for wider participation in administrative restraint-
granting bodies may initially appear unreasonable. It is possible to
argue that it contains an inherent contradiction. Some would say that
no independent member of the media who respects herself and her
profession would be willing to act as a censor. It should not be as-
sumed, however, that no honest artists or media persons will be found
who will be willing to acknowledge that freedom of speech is not ab-
solute, or who will not be prepared to examine in good faith, when-
ever required, whether there is justification for prior restraint.
Moreover, the current suspicion that administrative agencies are ill-
inclined toward freedom of speech ensues from the fact that in many
299. For a discussion of how administrative authorities exercise censorship powers
as experts and not as judges, see Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Proc-
ess", 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518,523 (1970).
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cases the authorities are public servants whose qualifications and insti-
tutional affiliations draw them closer to the interests that compete
with freedom of speech. The participation of women of letters along-
side these bureaucrats is likely to rectify, from an institutional point of
view, this inclination. The protection afforded to freedom of speech
will improve, and institutionally compelled decisions will be pre-
vented. Persons committed to freedom of speech therefore have a
clear interest in participating in administrative bodies, because their
participation will increase the overall protections given to speech.
Peer participation and review is already a common practice in the
decision-making process that governs state financial support for exhi-
bitions and other art projects.3 0 As noted, denial of government sup-
port is often considered a prior restraint of speech. 01 Nonetheless,
not only do artists and experts in art partake, as a matter of course, in
these decision-making bodies; they also feel quite strongly that the
transfer of their decision-making powers to bureaucrats would repre-
sent a threat to free speech.3°
Some commentators argue.that any administrative agency, no mat-
ter what its makeup, will have a "tendency to use its regulatory power,
because [its] sole reason for existence is to regulate. ' 30 3 Several points
contradict this position. First, the power under discussion is not the
power to censor, but the power to decide whether to censor. "Regu-
lating" here includes allowing publication; just because an agency will
regulate does not mean it will do so in a particular direction. Second,
if the institutional inclination thesis is correct, it should also be correct
in regard to judicial authorities. In other words, courts that are em-
powered to issue injunctions, whether they are directed at preventing
a publication or whether they concern restraint of other activities, also
tend to issue more injunctions than are necessary. From this perspec-
tive, courts have no advantage over executive authorities. In any
event, there are no grounds for preferring judicial to administrative
restraints on the basis of a fear of over zealousness.
B. Judicial Prior Restraint
Even if there are grounds justifying caution in the empowerment of
administrative agencies to exercise prior restraint, it is difficult to ac-
cept that the reservations concerning prior restraint are applicable to
orders issued by the judiciary. Indeed, commentators have expressed
the opinion that the doctrine of prior restraint should not be applied
to court decisions, or at least not to judicial decisions that have been
300. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts
and Sciences, 9 High Tech. L.J. 1, 4 (1994).
301. See supra part I.C.1.
302. See Fiss, State Activism, supra note 16, at 2094.
303. Redish, supra note 29, at 77 n.81.
[Vol. 68
PRIOR RESTRAINT
issued after a full and fair hearing3P
The basis for this position is that courts, in contrast to executive
bodies, are not "interested parties" whose objectivity must be
doubted. Nor are they dependent on the political system. Judges, in
contrast to professional administrative censors, are not likely to have
been appointed on the basis of their approach to matters of censor-
ship?3 5 Courts do not make decisions or issue orders on their own ini-
tiative, after having come to one-sided conclusions. It is difficult to
attribute a special institutional tendency to unconstitutionally restrict
freedom of speech to courts.? They are passive bodies that settle
disputes and conflicts between the parties. There is no dispute as to
their competence to consider, in adversarial proceedings, offenses re-
lating to speech, or their ability to determine punishments and other
sanctions with respect to speech. For these reasons, commentators
have viewed judicial restraints more favorably than administrative
ones.
In view of all the safeguards listed above,m the primary substantive
contentions that can be raised against judicial prior restraint is the
fear that the power will be exercised unlawfully, in the sense that
judges may erroneously issue injunctions against speech that is in fact
entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.3m A general fear
of potential judicial mistakes, however, cannot be sufficient justifica-
tion for the prohibition of judicial prior restraint. A fear always exists
that a judge may err in her judgment. The fear is as relevant in the
awarding of ex post damages as in the case of prior restraint. But
when the judge has before her all the relevant data, fear of mistake
cannot justify a grant of sweeping permission to harmful publications
that, from a substantive point of view, ought not to be protected.
Except in death penalty cases, the possibility that a court will err in
determining the facts or the law does not justify the general denial of a
remedy that is deemed appropriate per se. This is particularly true in
cases contemplated in this Article, because, as noted above, restriction
of the freedom of speech is permitted only in those exceptional cases
where there is a real chance that publication will lead to serious harm
to important values and interests.
It is reasonable to assume that courts generally will not err when
enjoining publications. Revoking the courts' power to issue injunc-
304. See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 426-30; Redish, supra note 29, at 57-58.
305. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, in The
Cost of Libel 121,126 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989).
306. For another opinion, see Hunter, supra note 69, at 289-90.
307. See supra notes 296-305 and accompanying text.
308. This is the primary contention apart from the contention against prior re-
straint in general (and not only prior restraint of speech). For a discussion of this con-
tention, see supra part III.C.
309. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 792-93 (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tions against speech because of the mere possibility that in exceptional
cases the courts will err injures basic values to which the law gives
preference over speech. Allowing unconstitutional results in numer-
ous cases to absolutely prevent the possibility of error-based unconsti-
tutional results in a few cases is not proper policy. Such a policy
would not be acceptable in any other context. If it were accepted it
would paralyze the legal system and the government as a whole. The
possibility of error in the implementation of the law does not abrogate
the need to apply the law. Constitutional means are needed to serve
and implement substantive constitutional goals. Means that do not
fundamentally conform to underlying constitutional norms cannot be
constitutional.
Moreover, the courts are already responsible for the imposition of
ex post sanctions, including punishment for speech crimes and the
award of compensation for speech torts. It is possible for courts to err
in their exercise of this power as well. The punishment of an innocent
man is no less unfortunate than the prior restraint of an expression.
Nevertheless, courts' ability to mete out criminal sentences is not re-
stricted because of the chance that they might occasionally err. Nei-
ther should their powers of prior restraint be limited for this reason.
An interesting contention has been made that judges may be over-
eager in their use of prior restraints because they will not want to be
responsible for the damage that petitioners claim will be done by a
particular body of speech.3 10 This argument is particularly compelling
when the state argues that the publication of an expression will harm
national security. The courts may prove willing to restrain speech in
these cases without rigorously demanding a demonstration that the
speech in question is constitutionally unprotected. The opposite is
likely to be the case in criminal cases, where judicial reluctance is
more likely to fixate on the notion of sending speakers to prison.
These arguments are not particularly well founded, and, in any
event, they do not justify the application of the doctrine of prior re-
straint to the judiciary. First, alongside cases such as Korematsu v.
United States, 312 in which the Court strayed from the constitutional
path because of the gravity of the risks alleged by the state,313 stand
examples such as New York Times v. United States,314 in which the
Court refused to grant an injunction despite the state's claim that one
was necessary to safeguard national security. Moreover, the existence
of the doctrine of prior restraint, itself a judicial creation, is evidence
of courts' unwillingness to overstep their bounds on a systematic basis.
310. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 47, at 1022-23.
311. See Powe, supra note 80, at 166.
312. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
313. See Eugene v. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 Yale
L.J. 489,503-04 (1945).
314. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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Second, even in its most absolute form, the prohibition against prior
restraints allows the prior restraint of expressions that are likely to
damage the ability of the state to conduct itself effectively during
war? 15 In any event, a judge who wants to avoid responsibility for po-
tential harm to national security will in all likelihood defer to the
opinion of military leaders on the substantive issue of whether or not
a particular expression is protected.
Third, even if the courts do tend to display special caution in al-
lowing the publication of expressions that may seriously harm national
security, this could be for legitimate reasons. The courts' caution
probably stems from the importance of the interests that are being
evaluated. Substantive constitutional law allows for the restriction of
freedom of speech for reasons of national security,316 and both sides of
that balance should be weighed equally by the courts. A lack of ea-
gerness to impose ex post sanctions on speech does not demonstrate
that they are a more appropriate and more careful form of speech
regulation than prior restraint; it merely shows that courts use ex post
sanctions in cases where the interests that are weighed against speech
rights are less valuable. Subsequent sanctions, by their nature, do not
directly guarantee the protection of the interests that are in conflict
with speech rights. Consequently, they are only used in the close
cases where society is reluctant to burden speech at all.
C. Procedural and Evidentiary Rules and Prior Restraint
Strict rules of evidence do not normally apply to administrative
hearings.3 17 An administrative agency is allowed to rely on hearsay
evidence, and can even base its decisions exclusively on such evi-
dence.3 13 Administrative bodies make their factual findings using a
preponderance of the evidence standard and do not have to prove
matters beyond a reasonable doubt, or even on the basis of clear and
convincing evidence.3?19 Administrative decisions do not require full
hearings32 and do not use juries?21
Similarly, when exercising their powers of prior restraint, courts do
not follow all the procedural and evidentiary rules that a criminal case
315. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,716 (1931).
316. See id. at 716.
317. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, Administrative Law 225
(1993).
318. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,402 (1971).
319. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 93 (1981) (discussing the "preponder-
ance-of-evidence" standard as applied by an administrative law judge).
320. See R. Cammon Turner, Note, Streamlining EPA's NPDES Permit Program
With Administrative Summary Judgment: Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 26 Envtl. L. 729, 735-39 (1996) (discussing the
power of administrative agencies to bypass hearings through rulemaking).
321. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 622
(1973).
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would require.3" In hearing applications for an injunction, courts ap-
ply the "balance of probabilities" evidentiary standard that is appro-
priate in civil cases, 3 3 and they do not demand proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.3 4  Moreover, there is no constitutional jury
requirement for civil injunctive proceedings.321
One commentator has noted that courts occasionally issue gag or-
ders and orders relating to criminal in camera proceedings after hear-
ing the direct parties to the case, but before other potentially inter-
ested parties, such as journalists, have had the opportunity to oppose
the orders. 6 This practice is a ground for objecting to courts' power
to issue such injunctions. 7
It appears inconceivable that one of the fundamental rights of
American law could be abrogated in a hearing that uses flimsy rules of
evidence and does not guarantee the right to a jury or the right to de-
fend oneself. The standards of administrative and civil law may suf-
fice for the routine decisions made in those fields, but, one could ar-
gue, they are certainly not satisfactory when the issue is the prior
restraint of speech. This argument, however, is not substantive in na-
ture, as it does not relate to the actual scope of free speech rights. In-
stead, it focuses on the fear that the procedural and evidentiary rules
that are used in prior restraint hearings will allow too many errors to
be made in the parsing of the substantive law. This is really just an-
other version of the fear-of-error argument discussed above.328
An effort to craft substantive rules to correct for procedural diffi-
culties of this type, however, should only follow an examination of the
possibility of simply fixing the procedures. The existing flaws in the
procedures used to implement prior restraint do not argue against the
constitutionality of prior restraint. The First Amendment instead re-
quires a change in procedure to produce desired substantive out-
comes.
329
A prima facie ground for preferring injunctive prior restraint to civil
sanctions is that the Constitution guarantees a jury in contempt pro-
ceedings but not in civil proceedings. Although all state constitutions
provide for a jury in civil cases, one commentator argues that "[i]f that
safeguard [were] removed.., it is possible that the First Amendment
would be read to require some such right in the case of civil actions
against speakers, in libel and privacy litigation for example. '331 In
322. See Fiss, Injunction, supra note 84, at 28-29; Redish, supra note 29, at 87-88.
323. See Redish, supra note 29, at 87-88.
324. See id.
325. See Monaghan, supra note 299, at 527.
326. See Hunter, supra note 69, at 288-89.
327. See id.
328. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
329. See Redish, supra note 29, at 64-65.
330. Blasi, supra note 27, at 63.
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other words, to properly preserve the constitutional right to freedom
of speech without precluding the possibility of enforcing legitimate
civil sanctions, it is desirable to interpret the First Amendment as re-
quiring that civil actions be conducted in accordance with certain pro-
cedures.
The Constitution, however, compels the establishment of special
evidentiary and procedural rules for prior restraint hearings when
such rules are necessary to ensure the protection of substantive consti-
tutional rights. The development of such rules, not an arbitrary ban
against prior restraints, is the proper aim of a constitutionalism of
means. Special procedural and evidentiary rules will improve existing
protections of freedom of speech because the prohibition against prior
restraint has a substantial number of exceptions.33 Currently, deci-
sions about whether an expression falls within one of these exceptions
are made using the standard rules?3 In contrast, the more demanding
procedures and evidentiary laws proposed in this Article extend to all
cases, including those in which prior restraints are currently allowed.
A detailed proposal for the reform of the procedural and eviden-
tiary rules used in constitutional cases is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle. Nevertheless, even under existing law, a person placed on trial
for the breach of an injunction or administrative order is entitled to
the procedural safeguards of the criminal law,333 even though the pro-
cedures used in issuing the injunction or order in question are either
civil or administrative. 34
The starting point for the proposed procedural rules is that the
proof required for prior restraints should be identical to what due
process demands in criminal cases. It is not clear that administrative
prior restraint hearings should require the use of every formal non-
constitutional rule of evidence, but the standard of proof should un-
questionably be beyond a reasonable doubt. Primarily, this means
that prior restraint of speech will be permitted only upon proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the speech in question does not merit
constitutional protection.335 There must be a presumption against
prior restraint, and the burden of proof must fall on the party re-
questing restraint.3 6
331. See supra part I.C.
332. See supra notes 322-25 and accompanying text.
333. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1968) (discussing a defendant's
constitutional right to a jury trial in a contempt proceeding).
334. See Mayton, supra note 40, at 277-78.
335. Cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314-16 (1979) (describing the evidentiary
requirements in civil actions for proving acts that constitute criminal offenses); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970) (discussing the requirement of proof of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials).
336. Cf. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978) (holding that a criminal de-
fendant is presumed innocent and that the prosecution bears the burden of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
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Where a particularly vexatious or unpopular expression is under
consideration, which will often be the case, it is reasonable to expect
that juries will not provide adequate protection for speech rights.337
Professional administrators, and, a fortiori, judges, may display
greater restraint than jury members in exercising powers that impair
the freedom to publish expressions that offend the public but that are
protected by the First Amendment. "The jury is a majoritarian insti-
tution... [and it is not] likely to protect dissidents from a popularly
elected government. '3 8 During the First World War, for example,
"the right to a jury trial for antiwar dissent became simply a right to
be convicted. '39 Still, a publisher who so desires should enjoy the
right to a jury in restraint hearings, even if that option will prove less
than helpful.
There may be exceptional circumstances in which the urgency of a
matter requires that a preliminary administrative or judicial decision
be made in the absence of the normal procedural safeguards 4 Such
time constraints, however, do not absolve the courts of the fundamen-
tal constitutional duty to refrain from abrogating freedom of speech
on the basis of evidence that would not suffice for conviction in a
criminal trial.
With regard to "gag orders" in criminal trials,141 the desirable solu-
tion to the problem does not lie in abandoning the injunctions com-
pelled by Sixth Amendment rights. Instead, courts must establish a
proper procedure for granting injunctions so that all relevant persons,
including those who are not direct parties to the criminal trial, are
heard before an injunction issues. After all, the establishment of pro-
cedures that ensure a proper balance between two conflicting consti-
tutional rights is itself a due process requirement.
D. The Collateral Bar Rule
A final procedural justification given for the prohibition against
prior restraints is that the doctrine constitutes a necessary corollary of
the collateral bar rule. 42 The collateral bar rule prevents a person
who has breached a judicial injunction or administrative order from
arguing against the constitutionality of the breached order during pro-
ceedings instituted against him because of the breach.43 The very
breach of such an injunction or order is an offense, regardless of the
fact that the order in question may have been unconstitutional. The
only arguments that the person in breach may raise in his defense are
337. See Mayton, supra note 40, at 277; Monaghan, supra note 299, at 528-29.
338. Laycock, Irreparable Injury, supra note 2, at 166.
339. Powe, supra note 80, at 77.
340. For a discussion of temporary orders of prior restraint, see infra part V.E.
341. See supra part IV.
342. See Tribe, supra note 29, at 1042-45; Hunter, supra note 69, at 286.
343. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,293-94 (1947).
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that (1) the court or administrative authority that made the decision
lacked substantive or formal competence, or (2) the law under which
the court granted the restraint was facially unconstitutional.-' This is
true even in cases such as Near v. Minnesota,15 where the restraint at
issue was identical to the provisions of a criminal statute u 6 obviously,
the constitutionality of the criminal statute would have been chal-
lengeable if the hearings had proceeded under its rubric.37 A person
in breach of a judicial or administrative order against publication is
therefore subject to punishment even if the order is unconstitutional
(to the extent that the order prohibits activities that the Constitution
protects).
Insofar as administrative licenses and judicial injunctions are en-
forceable by the police powers of the state, the collateral bar rule ef-
fectively allows the physical prevention of constitutionally protected
speech without judicial review. The purpose of the collateral bar rule
is to strengthen the obligation to respect the orders of competent
authorities. A citizen who believes that an order is unconstitutional
may appeal the order or attack it in another way; she may not take the
law into her own hands by ignoring the order. This is why the collat-
eral bar rule does not apply to general rules, such as statutes, the issu-
ance of which cannot be appealed.
The doctrine of prior restraint aims to prevent situations in which
the injured party has no opportunity to argue against the violation of
his rights. In this sense, it is a partial corrective of the collateral bar
rule. It reflects the special importance and status of freedom of
speech, since other rights are also subject to the collateral bar rule but
not to the prohibition against prior restraints.
While it is unclear that the collateral bar fully applies in contempt
proceedings that relate to the breach of judicial injunctions restraining
speech, 49 the following comments assume that the collateral bar rule
does apply in the speech context under current law. To the extent
that the rule does not apply to such decisions, the case against prior
restraints is even weaker.
While the status of the collateral bar rule is unclear in judicial con-
tempt hearings, it is quite clear as to administrative orders. The Su-
preme Court has held that where a licensing mechanism meets the
demands of the Constitution, a defendant accused of publishing with-
344. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967) (suggesting that
an injunction that was "transparently invalid" or that had been issued by a court
lacking jurisdiction would not be covered by the collateral bar rule).
345. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
346. See id. at 701-03.
347. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 16-19.
348. See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 293-94 (citing Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S.
181, 189-90 (1922)).
349. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 21-22.
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out a license cannot claim that the refusal of the license in his specific
case was unconstitutional.
There are two possible ways of contending with the arguments
against prior restraint that are grounded in the existence of the collat-
eral bar rule. One way is to argue against the constitutionality of the
collateral bar rule itself.51 If the rule were rescinded, nothing would
preclude arguments in contempt or criminal proceedings to the effect
that the order in question was unconstitutional because the speech at
issue was protected under the First Amendment. 2 The constitution-
ality of the collateral bar rule is beyond the scope of this Article,
which focuses only on the extent to which the rule justifies the doc-
trine of prior restraint.
The second argument, that courts should not be able to issue injunc-
tions against speech because of the collateral bar rule, is problematic
in two respects. First, the prohibition against prior restraints is not
necessarily the proper method of achieving a balance between the de-
sire to ensure respect for governmental orders and the desire to pre-
vent the violation of constitutional rights. The prohibition against
prior restraints actually limits the means available to state actors, but
the purpose of the collateral bar rule is purportedly the assurance of
respect for the decisions of state actors. 3  Restricting governmental
authorities' powers is a problematic method of safeguarding their
status.
Second, the collateral bar rule does not prevent direct attacks on
judicial orders on appeal or by petition.3 4 It merely prevents indirect
attacks on such orders within the framework of contempt proceedings.
In other words, a person against whom a court has issued an injunc-
tion does not lack a remedy against that order. He may apply to a
competent court and argue that the judicial order is unconstitutional
(or flawed for another reason) without his application being dismissed
in limine.355 The same is true if an administrative authority issued the
350. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 408-09, 414 (1953). There is room
for criticism of this judgment. On the surface it appears that the decisions of adminis-
trative authorities are not subject to many of the special considerations that justify
preventing indirect attacks on court decisions. Forbidding indirect attacks on admin-
istrative decisions in a licensing matter harms the institution of the collateral attack
per se.
351. See Richard E. Labunski, The "Collateral Bar" Rule and the First Amendment:
The Constitutionality of Enforcing Unconstitutional Orders, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 323,
327-33 (1988); Hal Scott Shapiro, Note, The Collateral Bar Rule-Transparently Inva-
lid: A Theoretical and Historical Perspective, 24 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 561, 583-88
(1991).
352. See Fiss, Injunction, supra note 84, at 30.
353. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1967) (quoting
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922)).
354. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 47, at 1022.
355. See id. at 1022.
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order: a person it injures may submit it for judicial review."
Outside the context of governmental restraints on speech, the price
that the collateral bar rule forces citizens to pay for the safeguarding
of the status of governmental authorities is not regarded as unreason-
able. The citizen is deprived of one way of implementing his or her
constitutional rights, but he has other methods available. Direct at-
tacks on judicial or administrative orders that violate constitutional
rights are usually no less efficient or convenient than indirect attacks.
The contrary is often true. For example, it is more efficacious to ap-
peal an unconstitutional judicial decision than to breach it because the
court that issued an injunction is unlikely to find it unconstitutionalV
An exception to the effectiveness of appeal may occur when the
matter is especially urgent. In such a case, directly attacking an in-
junction on appeal may take so long that it will destroy the value of
publication.3 15  An exception to the collateral bar rule in such situa-
tions may be appropriate. Even if such an exception does not gain
recognition, however, there is still little reason to deny courts the
power to issue injunctions against speech, so long as one agrees with
two reasonable assumptions about courts. The first assumption is that
judicial decisions are generally correct, and that most of those that are
not are reversed on appeal. The second assumption is that the Consti-
tution permits the limitation of speech rights only where such limita-
tion is necessary to prevent serious harm to values, rights, or interests
of great importance. A publication that is not entitled to constitu-
tional protection may cause serious damage, and it must not be taken
lightly. If these two assumptions are correct, cases in which serious
harm is caused by unprotected speech under the extant system are
probably more numerous than the cases in which freedom of speech
would be unconstitutionally impaired by prior restraints.
E. Prior Restraint and the Problem of Delay
The primary difficulty created by prior restraints lies in the delay
that they may cause in the publication of legitimate and desirable
speech.359 While most of the arguments against the use of prior re-
straints are speculative and confused, this argument has substance.
Any system that investigates the constitutional status of expressions
prior to publication runs a serious risk of delaying the publication of
speech that is entitled to First Amendment protections. Such delays
amount to per se violations of freedom of speech. Take, for example,
the case in which a newspaper desires to publish a piece about a po-
litical candidate immediately before an election. The candidate files
356. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,58 (1965).
357. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 44.
358. See infra part V.E.
359. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 30-33, 64-67.
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an application for an injunction against the article's publication on the
grounds that it is defamatory. The court agrees and issues an injunc-
tion. From the perspective of constitutionalism of means, the injunc-
tion imposes no difficulty if the speech under consideration does not
enjoy the substantive protections of the Constitution. If, however, it
becomes clear that the newspaper piece should in fact receive full con-
stitutional protection, then even after the injunction has been voided
the intervening delay will have amounted to a serious violation of the
First Amendment.3" Even the delays caused by temporary injunc-
tions may violate freedom of speech and the important public and pri-
vate interests underlying it.
As discussed above,3 61 however, because substantive freedom of
speech is not absolute, there cannot be a requirement that the consti-
tutionalism of means implement substantive freedom of speech abso-
lutely. That requirement would ignore competing values and inter-
ests. The constitutional means used to protect freedom of speech
should be consistent with the substantive scope of the right.
Because substantive constitutional law does not attribute absolute
value to freedom of speech, 62 concerns about delay cannot trump all
other concerns in the formulation of a constitutionalism of means.
Taking all possible measures to prevent potential violations of sub-
stantive freedom of speech, at the expense of the interests in whose
name substantive freedom of speech was limited in the first place,
would be inappropriate. An argument that the possibility of delay
should bar the use of prior restraint can only proceed from the prem-
ise that freedom of speech is more important than the interests pro-
tected by prior restraints. In some circumstances, however, these in-
terests are more important than free speech.363 Therefore, allowing
the harms to substantive speech rights that delays cause to automati-
cally prohibit the use of prior restraints would create a fundamental
discrepancy between the constitutionalism of means and substantive
constitutional theory. To achieve consistency, the means used to im-
plement freedom of speech must produce substantive free speech out-
comes in those contexts, and only in those contexts, in which speech
interests substantively outweigh other interests.
No means exist, however, that would guarantee absolute consis-
tency in this sense. Subsequent sanctions do not guarantee the non-
publication of unprotected speech in some contexts, and at other
times they may unconstitutionally burden protected speech. Because
of the delays that it causes, prior restraint also violates free speech
360. Similarly, if the newspaper assumes that it will be enjoined, and for this reason
cancels publication, serious harm to freedom of speech will result. Cf. id. at 30 (dis-
cussing the potential for a licensing system to cause delay and self-censorship).
361. See supra part I.
362. See Posner, Economics of Justice, supra note 10, at 33340.
363. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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rights in some cases. While acknowledging that there will be discrep-
ancies in certain cases, jurists must aspire to achieve the maximum
possible overall consistency between means and substances.
At the same time, the Constitution must be read as imposing a duty
to do everything possible to fully implement its substantive provisions,
even if that means creating novel regulatory schemes. For example, in
Freedman v. Maryland, the Court held that an administrative li-
censing scheme, clearly a prior restraint, was constitutional if the re-
straints were judicially reviewed within a short period of time.m In
practice, such solutions appear to be feasible in most cases. Occasion-
ally, however, a case will require means that might produce unwanted
substantive results.
It is a matter of dispute whether temporary restraining orders
("TROs") that enjoin publications are prior restraints. Some argue
that they are remedies, and therefore restraints, in and of themselves,
while others maintain that they are merely a step in the process of ap-
plying for a restraint such as an injunction. The constitutionality of
TROs against speech should not depend on the extent to which they
can be analogized to prior restraints. Instead, the threshold question
should be whether an injunction would be constitutionally permissible
in the case at hand, because TROs are interim orders that pave the
way for injunctions. If it is clear in advance that a permanent restraint
could not be granted, there is no room for a temporary remedy.
The hard case, however, arises when it is not clear in advance
whether or not permanent prior restraint would be a constitutional
option. The constitutionality of permanent prior restraint will likely
become clear only after extended proceedings in many cases; in fact,
the resolution of this question is often the reason for the proceeding.
A judge confronted with a request for a TRO will therefore be unable
to immediately determine whether a restraint will be found constitu-
tional after a full trial. There are several ways to look at these "hard"
cases.
On the one hand, restraint of protected speech violates the First
Amendment even when it is temporary. Delay harms the interests of
both the publisher and the public, especially when the speech in ques-
tion is time-sensitive news or commercial speech. In practice, the
court will usually not have the factual and legal groundwork necessary
to determine whether the speech under consideration in a TRO
hearing is likely to violate anti-speech entitlements to the extent that
364. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
365. See id. at 58-59.
366. The latter view was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1990). This approach, and the Supreme
Court's refusal to consider the matter, have been widely criticized. See Bernabe-
Reifkohl, supra note 45, at 297-302 & n.214 (listing sources).
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free speech rights should be limited. 67 Granting a TRO in such a
situation would therefore almost always violate the First Amendment,
because it is nearly impossible in such a setting to demonstrate that
the restraint meets the necessary substantive constitutional standards.
On the other hand, refraining from granting a TRO against a publi-
cation may frustrate the substantive law that entitles the applicant to
obtain prior restraint. When a court denies an application for a TRO
and the publisher releases the speech into the public domain, the later
issuance of an injunction becomes useless. The permanent injunction
would be analogous to locking a stable door after the horses have al-
ready fled.368 If substantive law entitles plaintiffs to prior restraint,
civil procedure must ensure that this relief, if and when it is granted, is
effective.
The considerations on both sides have merit, and it is impossible to
completely resolve the issue one way or the other. There is no reason,
however, to have a general presumption supporting or opposing the
granting of TROs against speech. In this sense, TROs differ from in-
junctions. At the time of a TRO hearing, no decision has yet been
made about the constitutional status of the speech in question; in a
permanent restraint hearing, on the other hand, the speech has al-
ready been determined to be substantively unprotected, which means
that it is probably also undesirable. In TRO hearings, there is room
for a flexible approach that will balance the potential damage caused
by a delay (if the speech is indeed protected) against the harms that
might arise from publication (if the speech ultimately turns out to be
unprotected). Because of the special sensitivity of this issue, courts
should try to examine the record in front of them with extra care, so
that they may approximate as closely as possible the results of the
primary proceedings.
CONCLUSION
While "[a] criminal statute chills, a prior restraint freezes. ' 369 The
fact that prior restraint of unprotected speech prevents unwanted
speech and protects those interests that might be harmed by it, how-
ever, is not a drawback. It is one of the method's greatest advan-
tages.37 "Freezing" speech that the First Amendment does not pro-
tect should not be repugnant as a rule. Every reasonable measure
should be undertaken to prevent such speech, including the use of
both prior restraints and ex post sanctions. On the other hand,
367. See, e.g., Fiss, Injunction, supra note 84, at 28-29 (describing preliminary in-
junctions and temporary restraining orders).
368. At the same time, certain types of speech, such as obscene publications, are
continuously or cumulatively damaging, and in these cases it would be efficacious to
permanently enjoin publication even if temporary relief was not originally granted.
369. Bickel, supra note 141, at 61.
370. See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 429.
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avoiding freezing, or even chilling, speech that is protected by the
Constitution is essential.
This Article argues that there is no reason to prohibit the use of
prior restraints against substantively unprotected speech. It remains
strictly neutral about the appropriate scope of substantive free speech
rights. At the same time, a reciprocal connection may exist between
the scope of substantive freedom of speech and the means used to in-
stantiate it. For example, it is probably impossible to reconcile the
prohibition against prior restraints with a substantive theory that im-
poses positive pro-speech duties on the stateY71
The doctrine of prior restraint does not always promote the funda-
mental principles of freedom of speech, and in many cases actually
hinders their development. It is difficult to criticize commentators
and politicians for refusing to read positive state duties into the First
Amendment when the persistence of the doctrine of prior restraint
would combine with such duties to produce absurd results.m
Instead of contributing to the procedural protection of unprotected
speech, the doctrine of prior restraint leads to a reduction in the num-
ber of expressions that are entitled to substantive protection. Focus-
ing on the doctrine of prior restraint facilitates courts' acceptance of
the restriction of substantive freedom of speech, because they can be
satisfied that while they may be burdening speech, they are not acting
unconstitutionally by restraining it. Considering the onerous nature
of some ex post sanctions, however, there is no reason to be particu-
larly reassured by this state of affairs. Some speech that is currently
outside the scope of substantive First Amendment protection may
have enjoyed protection in the absence of the prohibition against
prior restraints.
Aside from the damage that it does to substantive free speech val-
ues, the prior restraint doctrine also impairs incommensurable anti-
speech entitlements, such as the rights to reputation and to privacy.
When these entitlements are protected by liability rules, people are
forced to sell them at prices set by the state, despite the fact that the
amount they receive will be incommensurable to the harm they have
suffered. The inability to restrain speech may occasionally vitiate
anti-speech entitlements entirely, disturbing our carefully calibrated
substantive constitutional balances. Further, making individuals bear
the cost of the production of widely enjoyed social benefits is a clear
negative externality, and such a system is difficult to justify.
The inconsistencies that the doctrine of prior restraint creates be-
tween substantive and means-centric constitutional theories nega-
tively affect both speech entitlements and anti-speech entitlements.
371. See Tribe, supra note 29, at 965.
372- See, e.g., Sunstein, Democracy, supra note 74, at 227 (describing governmental
funding of the arts as a discretionary matter).
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This lack of consistency is not, therefore, only a formal or aesthetic
flaw. Its repercussions are not limited to the field of constitutional
means; it also raises serious substantive problems. While absolute
consistency between means and substances may not be possible, it is
nevertheless an important aspiration. This aspiration is the appropri-
ate goal of any constitutionalism of means.
